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The Importance of Economic Reality and
Risk in Defining Federal Securities
By 3. THOMAS HANNAN*
and
WILLIAM E. THoMAS* *
THE definition of the term "security," as used in the principal fed-
eral securities laws, is for the most part one of the best kept secrets in
recent legal history. The Securities Act of 1933 purports to define
the term,' but the definition itself presents a Pandora's box of impos.
ing dimensions. Determination of the issue reqires the application
of broad statutory language and divergent case law to a seemingly end-
less succession of new promotional schemes.
Since the inception of the federal securities laws, the Supreme
Court has considered the defintion of the term "security" on five
occasions. 2 In each case, the Court found that the challenged trans-
action constituted a security and rebuked the court of appeals for
reading the statutory definition too restrictively. In each of these in-
stances, the Supreme Court dealt principally with only one of the sev-
eral statutory definitions, namely, "investment contracts." Since 1946
the Court has construed the term "investment contract" in light of a
definition given by Justice Murphy in the second of the five decisions,
SEC v. W. J. Howey Co.' Recently, several commentators have
* A.B. 1960, Dartmouth College; J.D. 1966, University of California, Berkeley;
Member, California Bar.
** A.B., University of California, Santa Barbara; J.D. 1973, University of Cali-
fornia, Hastings College of the Law, Member, California Bar.
1. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 2(1), 48 Stat. 74, as amended 15 U.S.C.
§ 77(b)(1) (1970). Although the definition consists, in part, of terms which are nar-
row and reasonably clear, the broader portions of the statutory definition are trouble-
some. See note 13 and accompanying text infra.
2. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967); SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins.
Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967); SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of America, 359 U.S.
65 (1959); SEC v. WJ. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing
Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
3. 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).
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criticized the rigid "Howey formula" as being ill-suited to meet the
issues raised by novel promotional schemes.4
Thus, on the one hand, the Supreme Court has consistently held
that the challenged transactions did constitute securities. On the
other hand, the continued reaffirmance of a test for the principally liti-
gated defimtional terms5 perpetuates a mechanistic and narrow defim-
tion in terms of today's promotions. The purpose of this article is to
suggest that, despite the formulas and rhetoric, the common thread
which winds throughout the forty years of experience with the defini-
tion involves an analysis of risk in the light of economic reality
Background
Prior to 1933, securities regulation was the exclusive province of
the states. Congress, in defining the term "security," borrowed freely
from the earlier Blue Sky laws.6 The final product was drafted "in
sufficiently broad and general terms so as to include within that defini-
tion the many types of instruments that in our commercial world fall
within the ordinary concept of security ,,7 The resulting definition is
set forth as follows in the Securities Act of 1933.
When used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise re-
quires-
(1) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock,
bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of inter-
est or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-
trust certificate, preorgamzation certificate or subscription, trans-
4. This article is no exception, if the Howey formula is viewed as a strict limita-
tion upon the definition of the term security. E.g., Coffey, The Economic Realities
of a "Security"- Is There a More Meaningful Formula?, 18 CASE W REs. L. REV. 367
(1967) [hereinafter cited as Coffey]; Long, An Attempt to Return "Investment Con-
tracts" to the Mainstream of Securities Regulation, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 135 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Long].
5. Not surprisingly, since the Supreme Court has focused on the term "invest-
ment contract," lower courts, practitioners and commentators have also done so.
6. The 1933 Act in turn became the model for the definitional section in the
Uniform Securities Act, section 401(1), which has been adopted in one form or another
in 25 states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. 7 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 691
(master ed. 1970). Since these subsequent state securities laws have been modeled af-
ter the federal statutes, the judicial precedents of either sovereignty may be of assist-
ance in interpreting the various terms. Indeed, the interlocking relationship between
these jurisdictions is one of the principal reasons cited by Professor Louis Loss, reporter
for the American Law Institute Federal Securities Code Project, for recommending as
little revision as possible in the definitional section. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 297, Com-
ment (Tent. Draft No. 1, April 1972). See note 53 infra. Professor Loss also points
out that one must be careful in noting the differences in the specific wording of the
various state and federal statutes. I L. Loss, SECURITES REGULATIONS (2d ed. 1961)
456 [hereinafter cited as Loss].
7. H.R. REP No. 85, 73rd Cong., ist Sess. 11 (1933).
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ferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certifi-
cate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil,
gas or other mineral right, or, in general, any interest or instru-
ment commonly known as a 'security,' or any certificate of in-
terest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, re-
ceipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or pur-
chase, any of the foregoing.8
This definition has formed the basis for subsequent congressional def-
initions.' The definitional sections of the Investment Company Act1"
and the Investment Advisers Act1 contain precisely the same defini-
tion, but, surprisingly, the definitional section of the Securities Exchange
Act of 193412 contains a slightly different definition." The terms,
8. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970), formerly ch. 38, § 2(1),
48 Stat. 74 (1933).
9. One related Congressional definition is contained m the Public Utility Hold-
ing Company Act of 1935, ch. 687, § 2(a) (16), 49 Stat. 803, as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 79b(a) (16) (1970). That definition is identical to that of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, with the addition of the terms "draft," "receivers' or trustees' certifi-
cates," "guarantee of," and "assumption of liability on . . any of the foregoing."
15 U.S.C. § 78c(10) (1970). The Trust Indenture Act of 1939, ch. 411 § 303(11),
53 Stat. 1152, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77ccc(11) (1970) contains a restrictive defi-
nition of the term security. Although it is different and more simplistic, it is intended
to serve only the limited purpose of defining the term "indenture security" m connec-
tion with the disqualification of a trustee under a trust indenture.
10. Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 411, § 2(a)(35), 54 Stat. 789, as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a) (36) (1970).
11. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, ch. 686, § 202(a) (17), 54 Stat. 847, as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a) (18) (1970).
12. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (10) (1970), formerly
ch. 404, § 3(10), 48 Stat. 881.
13. The following table sets forth a side-by-side comparison of the definitions
in the principal statutes with the differences m each emphasized.
Securities Act of 1933, Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Investment Advisers Act of
1940, Investment Company
Act of 1940
1. The term "security" means 1. The term "security" means
2. any note, 2. any note,
3. stock, 3. stock,
4. treasury stock, 4. treasury stock,
5. bond, 5. bond,
6. debenture, 6. debenture,
7. evidence of indebtedness, 7.
8. certificate of interest or 8. certificate of interest or
participation m any profit- participation in any profit-
sharing agreement, sharing agreement
9. 9. or in any oil, gas, or other
mineral royalty or lease,
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"stock," "treasury stock," "bond" and "debenture" which appear in
each of the statutes are reasonably precise and have not resulted in
great confusion. 14  Certain of the remaining definitions, however, hav-e
perplexed both the courts and the commentators. This article addresses
itself primarily to a portion of this residuum.
The differences in the definitions contained in the 1933 Act and
the 1934 Act at first appear substantial. There is a variation, for ex-
ample, in the language relating to oil, gas and mineral interests. Fur-
thermore, with respect to the clause in the 1933 Act, "or, in general, any
interest or instrument commonly known as a 'security'," one notes that
the 1934 Act omits the reference to "any interest." This omission
would presumably limit that section to interests embodied in a docu-
12. transferable share, 12. transferable share,
13. investment contract, 13. investment contract,
14. voting-trust certificate, 14. voting-trust certificate,
15. certificate of deposit for 15. certificate of deposit for
a security, a security,
16. fractional undivided 16.
interest in oil, gas or
other mineral rights,
17 or, in general, any inter- 17 or, in general, any lnstru-
est or instrument corn- ment commonly known as a
monly known as a "security", "security";
18. or any certificate of inter- 18. or any certificate of inter-
est or participation in, est or participation in,
temporary or interim temporary or interim certifi-
certificate for, receipt cate for, receipt for, or
for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe
warrant or right to subscribe to or to purchase, any of the
or purchase, any of the foregoing;
foregoing.
19. 19. but shall not include cur-
rency or any note, draft,
bill of exchange, or banker's
acceptance which has a
maturity at the time of
issuance of not exceeding
nine months, exclusive of
days of grace, or any renewal
thereof the maturity of which
is likewise limited.
14. There is a body of jurisprudence surrounding each of these terms, their dif-
ferences and similarities, which is beyond the scope of this article. It was argued in
SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943) that the more specific terms
ought to prevail over the more general terms. The Court, in rejecting this ejusdem
generis argument, said, "We cannot read out of the statute these general descriptive
designations merely because more specific ones have been used to reach some kinds
of documents. [The reach of the Act does not stop with the obvious and com-
monplace. Novel, uncommon, or irregular devices, whatever they appear to be, are
also reached if it be proved as [a] matter of fact that they were widely offered or dealt
in under terms or courses of dealing which established their character in commerce
as 'investment contracts,' or as 'any interest or instrument commonly known as a secur-
ity.'" Id. at 351.
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ment. However, the most glaring omission in the 1934 Act is the com-
plete absence of the term "evidence of indebtedness." Utilization of
this language in an action founded upon Rule 10b-5"5 might thus be in-
hibited. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, in Tcherepnin v Knight,'0
attached no significance to the omission of the term "evidence of in-
debtedness" from the 1934 Act." In this case the transaction con-
stituted a security, as measured by other definitional terms, and the
court of appeals had wrongly construed the transaction as constituting
an evidence of indebtedness. 18  Significantly, however, the court also
emphasized that the 1933 Act precedents are generally applicable to
interpretation of the 1934 Act.19 Accordingly, it may be unavailing
to seek to establish technical differences between the definitions con-
tained in the two acts.
The Supreme Court and Investment Contracts
as Securities
Most courts have defined securities as "investment contracts," an
often-litigated term which appears both in the federal and in most state
securities laws,20 but which the statutes do not explain further. Con-
sequently, it has devolved upon the courts to identify those schemes
which can be characterized as investment contracts within the purview
of the acts. The term has been the focal point in dealing with the pro-
liferation of new and ingemous forms of public financing designed to
15. SEC Rule 10(b)-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10(b)-5 (1973), promulgated under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78(j)(b) (1970).
16. 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
17. Id. at 344.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 336. Professor Alan Bromberg correctly cautions however that: "Full
equivalence of the 1933 and 1934 Act definitions does not necessarily follow. There
is some reason to interpret 'security' more broadly for antifraud purposes (now prumar-
ily a 1934 Act matter) than for registration purposes (primarily a 1933 Act matter).
It is easier to justify a remedy for an investor who has been defrauded in a borderline
'security' than to give him an automatic remedy per SA [Securities Act of 1933] Sec-
tion 12(1) because the security was not registered under the 1933 Act. This kind
of distinction might well be made in areas of traditional public trading (like commodity
futures) or public offerings .(like franchises and oil or real estate interests) without
registration. It should be noted that the Supreme Court, in Tcherepnin, was dealing
with (1) an interest exempt from the 1933 Act registration requirements by SA § 3(a)
(5), and (2), a suit under 10b-5, and therefore was not faced with a self-executing
right of recovery for failure to register." 1 A. BROMB-RG, SEcUPrrMs LAw" FRAuD, §
4.6, at 82.2 (1971). So far, however, the cases have not expressly recognized this
distinction and in Bromberg's view, it does not appear that Congress intended such a
distinction. Id.
20. See note 6 supra.
January 19741 DEFINING FEDERAL SECURITIES
evade the letter, if not the spirit, of the securities acts. The jurispru-
dence surrounding the defimtion of the term "investment contracts"
appears to be experiencing a reappraisal. To appreciate this process
fully, this section begins by tracing the development of landmark Umted
States Supreme Court decisions, as modified by current legal trends.
Ten years after the promulgation of the 1933 Act, the Supreme
Court, in SEC v C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp.,2 issued its first opinion
on the interpretation of this defiitional language. The case involved
a campaign to sell oil leases, accompamed by representations that de-
fendants would drill a test well which would prove the productivity
of the vendee's acreage. In response to defendant's argument that
this was merely the offer of "naked leasehold rights," Justice Jackson
perceptively observed:
The drilling of this well was not an unconnected or uncontrolled
phenomenon to which salesman pointed merely to show the pos-
sibilities of the offered leases. The exploration enterprise was
woven into these lease-holds, in both an economic and a legal
sense; the undertaking to drill a well runs through the whole
transaction as the thread on which everybody's beads were strung.
22
Justice Jackson emphasized the underlying purpose of the Sec-
urities Act:
It is clear that an economic interest in this well-drilling under-
taking was what brought into being the instruments that defend-
ants were selling and gave to the instruments most of their value
and all of their lure. The trading in these documents had all the
evils inherent in the securities transactions which it was the aim
of the Securities Act to end.
23
In reversing the lower court, Justice Jackson refused to be bound
by a specific formula in defining the term "investment contracts."
Rather, he followed the lead of prior state and federal decisions and
chose to place his holding on general policy grounds, suggesting a
case-by-case analysis.
The test rather is what character the instrument is given in com-
merce by the terms of the offer, the plan of distribution, and the
economic inducements held out to the prospect. In the enforce-
ment of an act such as this it is not inappropriate that promoters'
offerings be judged as being what they were represented to be.
24
Three years later the Supreme Court decided the often cited case
of SEC v W J Howey Co.2 5 Justice Murphy, speaking for the
21. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
22. Id. at 348.
23. Id. at 349.
24. Id. at 352-53.
25. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
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majority, chose to isolate the elements which in his opinion were the
distinctive features of an investment contract. The fact situation in-
volved the sale of citrus acreage accompanied by an option to pur-
chase service contracts which would obligate an affiliated corporation
to cultivate and market the fruit. As in Joiner, it was impractical for
the purchasers to participate in the development of their own land be-
cause of their lack of sophistication, absenteeism and the economic dif-
ficulties of piecemeal forming. Noting that Congress had been in-
fluenced by the prior Blue Sky laws,2 Justice Murphy purported to
rely upon state decisions to fashion a test which, he concluded, was con-
sistent with statutory aims:
[A]n investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act means
a contract, transaction or scheme whereby[(1)] a person invests
his money [(2)] in a common enterprise and [(3)] is led to ex-
pect profits [(4)] solely from the efforts of the promoter or a
third party, it being immaterial whether the shares m the enter-
prise are evidenced by formal certificates or by nominal inter-
ests in the physical assets employed by the enterprise.
2 7
This sentence quickly became a magic four-part standard28 for
judging whether a particular transaction involved an "investment con-
tract." Later decisions have rarely, if ever, construed this term without
considering, if not relying upon, the Howey formula. Indeed, this
formula has become so revered that it has prompted many members
of the legal community to call for a major reassessment of its under-
lying strengths and weaknesses. 9
Like many "black letter" phrases, the Howey formula contains the
seeds of its own destruction. Predictably, clever lawyers and promot-
ers have found means to circumvent the black letter; they always
have and always will, no matter now thoughtful the mechanical rub-
ric. In fairness to Justice Murphy, however, it should be pointed out
that many of the criticisms directed at the test are the result of
26. Id. at 298-99.
27. Id. at 298-99.
28. Many refer to Howey as a three-pronged test. This is accomplished by com-
bmmg the last two factors as one. Because this article deals with these two concepts
separately, they are segregated herein and Howey is referred to as a four-factor test.
29. Some writers claim the Hovey decision rests upon a weak precedential foun-
dation. In a very thoughtful article, Professor Joseph Long concludes: "Justice Mur-
phy was m error when he claimed to be restating a definition which had received ui-
versal acceptance by prior cases and the effect of the Howey case was to perpetuate
a test which was misleading and did not accurately reflect the policy behind securities
regulation. What makes the Howey test even more tragic is the ill-chosen language
used to frame the test and the fact that the test was totally unnecessary to the disposi-
tion of the case." Long, supra note 4, at 177. See also Coffey, supra note 4.
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considering the test apart from the remaining opinion. Justice Mur-
phy specifically recogmzed that congressional intent augured against
restrictive or rigid interpretations. "The statutory policy of affording
broad protection to investors is not to be thwarted by unrealistic and
irrelevant formulae." 30  Indeed, the Howey decision was in reaction
to the Fifth Circuit's overly narrow reading of the defimtion. 3
The Supreme Court subsequently has considered "investment con-
tracts" on three occasions. In each instance the transaction in
question was found to involve an investment contract. SEC v Vari-
able Annuity Life Insurance Co. of America3 2 ("VALIC") dealt with
the issue of whether so-called "variable annuity" contracts were required
to be registered under the 1933 Act. Conventional life insurance and
annuity contracts are expressly exempted from the 1933 Act by virtue
of section 3(a) (8),' 3 the sole regulatory power being lodged with
the states pursuant to the McCarran-Ferguson Act.34 While variable
annuity contracts contain many features of classical insurance,3 5 they
are distinguishable because they guarantee no fixed monthly or yearly
amount. Premium payments are made in consideration of a pro rata
interest in a securities portfolio. 6 Therefore, the amount due to the
30. 328 U.S. at 301.
31. A more thorough discussion of this issue is reserved for the section "An Ana-
lytic Framework," infra.
32. 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
33. "Except as hereinafter expressly provided, the provisions of this subchapter
shall not apply to any of the following classes of securities: [any insurance or
endowment policy or annuity contract or optional annuity contract, issued by a cor-
poration subject to the supervision of the insurance commissioner, bank commissioner,
or any agency or officer performing like functions, of any State or Territory of the
United States or the District of Columbia." Securities Act of 1933, § 3(a)(8), 15
U.S.C. § 77(c)(a)(8) (1970).
34. Section 2(b) provides, "No act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate,
impair, or supercede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the
business of insurance " 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1970).
35. "[P]ayments are made periodically; they continue until the annuitant's death
or in case other options are chosen until the end of a fixed term or until the death
of the last of two persons; payments are made both from principal and income; and
the amounts vary according to the age and sex of the annuitant. Moreover, actuarily
both the fixed-dollar annuity and the variable annuity are calculated by identical princi-
ples. Each issuer assumes the risk of mortality from the moment the contract is issued.
That risk is an actuarial prognostication that a certain number of annuitants will sur-
vive to specified ages. Even if a substantial number live beyond their predicted de-
mise, the company issuing the annuity-whether it be fixed or vanable-is obligated
to make the annuity payments on the basis of the mortality prediction reflected in the
contract." SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of America, 359 U.S. 65, 70 (1959).
36. The principal appeal of variable annuity contracts is their purported ability
to function as a hedge against inflation.
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annuitant is variable, being subject to the success or failure of the of-
feror's investment policy.
The companies that issue these annuities take the risk of failure
[prognostication of mortality]. But they guarantee nothing to the
annuitant except an interest in a portfolio of common stocks or
other equities-an interest that has a ceiling but no floor.ar
The Court divided five to four and held that the insurance ex-
emption did not apply. The dissenters stressed the strong policy m
favor of state regulation of the insurance industry. For the purposes
of this discussion, however, that policy question is less important than
the consideration of the test used by the Court to determine whether
insurance was in fact involved. In the view of Justice Douglas, speak-
ing for the majority, that issue turned on an analysis of the allocation
of risk.
The difficulty is that, absent some guarantee of fixed income, the
variable annuity places all the investment risks on the annuitant,
none on the company. The holder gets only a pro rata share of
what the portfolio of equity interest reflects-which may be a
lot, a little or nothing..... [Tihe concept of 'insurance' in-
volves some investment risk-taking on the part of the company.
88
In Justice Brennan's concurring opinion, this concept of investment
risk was more finely detailed, and was keyed to the disclosure philos-
ophy of the act.
[O]ne of the basic premises of state regulation would appear to
be that in one sense the investor in an annuity or life insurance
company not become a direct sharer in the company's investment
experience; that his investment in the policy or contract be suf-
ficiently protected to prevent this. But the situation changes
where the coin of the company's obligation is not money but is
rather the present condition of its investment portfolio. . . Pre-
scribed limitations on investment and examination of solvency
and reserves become perfectly circular to the extent that there is
no obligation to pay except in terms measured by one's port-
folio. . . Where the nature of the obligation assumed is such,
the federally protected interests in disclosure to the investor of
the nature of the corporation to whom he is asked to entrust his
money and the purposes for which it is to be used become ob-
vious and real. The contract between the investor and the organi-
zation no longer squares with the sort of contract in regard to
which Congress in 1933 thought its "disclosure" statute was un-
necessary.
8 9
This delicate mixture of risk and policy was explored more care-
37. 359 U.S. at 71-72.
38. Id. at 71.
39. Id. at 78.
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fully eight years later in SEC v United Benefit Life Insurance Co. 40
The defendants were engaged in the sale of "Flexible Fund" annuities.
These contracts resembled the variable annuities in VALIC in that pur-
chasers' premiums were invested in defendants' managed fund. How-
ever, in VALIC the contracts contained no element of fixed return,
whereas these defendants guaranteed a minimum cash value ranging
from 50 percent of net premiums the first year to 100 percent after
ten years. The issue was squarely presented: How much risk must the
insurer assume to qualify for exemption pursuant to section 3(a)(8)
of the 1933 Act?
The Court, speaking through Justice Harlan who had authored the
dissent in VALIC, held that despite defendants' guarantee, a substan-
tial part of the investment risk still remained with the policy-holder, not
the insurer. "The basic difference between a contract which to some
degree is insured and a contract of insurance must be recogmzed." 41
The United Benefit Life case represented the fourth occasion on which
the Supreme Court had reversed and criticized the lower court for
drawing an overly rigid interpretation of the defimtion of a security
In considering VALIC to have turned solely on the absence of
any substantial investment risk-taking on the part of the insurer
there, we think that the Court of Appeals in the present case
viewed that decision too narrowly.
42
The opinions in VAL1C and United Benefit Life present a notable
contrast to the four-factor approach of Howey By examining risk to
the investor in terms of public policy, the Court suggested a more
flexible standard. It is possible to maintain that these decisions are
sui generis, and are limited to determining the breadth of the insur-
ance exemption. On the other hand, it is significant that the Court
is speaking in terms of risk allocation. It is submitted that the
policy of investor protection is inextricably interwoven with the con-
cept of risk allocation. When a scheme is designed to shift all or sub-
stantially all of the investment risk to the purchaser, public policy
weighs heavily in favor of disclosure of these material facts.
The Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on the definition
of a security was in Tcherepnin v Knight, decided under the 1934 Act,
unlike prior precedent.43  The case holds that withdrawable capital
shares in a savings and loan association fall within a number of statutory
40. 387 U.S. 202 (1967).
41. Id. at 211.
42. Id. at 210.
43. 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
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niches,44 the closest being the classical investment contract (tested under
the Howey criteria). Once again the Court refused to accept the
picayune restrictions placed upon the definition of a security by the
appellate court. "We have little difficulty fitting the withdrawable
capital shares held by the petitioners into that expansive concept of
security.
' 45
Tcherepnin was a classic Howey situation, so there was no need
to re-examine Justice Murphy's four-pronged test. The Tcherepnn
decision was particularly interesting, however, in that the Court recog-
nized other definitional pegs, such as "certificates of interest or partici-
pation in any profit sharing agreement," "stock," and "transferable
shares."46 The contention of the court of appeals that the definitional
term "instruments commonly known as a 'security'" was a limitation
on the other definitional pegs was rejected.47 The notion that the
omission of the term "evidence of indebtedness" from the 1934 Act
is significant was likewise rejected.48 It is possible that all of the
Tcherepnin opinion is dicta, other than the holding that the interests
were investment contracts. Yet, even if it is dicta, it seems very signi-
ficant. The Court appears to be saying unanimously: (1) do not ig-
nore the other definitional pegs in analyzing securities transactions; (2)
the legislative history of the 1933 and 1934 Acts may be read to-
gether to afford broad coverage in the definition of the term security;
and (3) with an eye toward federal policy, look to substantive econ-
omic realities to determine as a matter of federal law whether these
realities constitute a security.4"
44. See text accompanying notes 223-251 infra for a discussion of other defim-
tions of a security.
45. 389 U.S. at 338.
46. Id. at 339-40.
47. Id. at 343.
48. Id. at 344.
49. With respect to ascertaining what kinds of transactions involve securities for
the purposes of civil antifraud litigation, the following question is raised: Are the same
definitions of the term "security" to be used in this instance? The answer appears
to be yes. Tcherepnrn was a private implied civil antifraud action. Chief Justice War-
ren, speaking for an unanimous Court, in determining that withdrawable capital shares
of an Illinois savings and loan association were securities under the 1934 Act, reviewed
the legislative history of the 1933 Act and found that an exemption from registration
had been sought by the United States Building & Loan Association and granted by
Congress in section 3a(5) of the 1933 Act. This fact was taken to indicate that Con-
gress intended the securities of these associations to be a "security" within the defim-
tion of the 1934 Act. In Tcherepnin, the Court was not squarely asked to consider
any dichotomy between private and regulatory actions under the antifraud provisions
of the 1933 Act. Indeed, it was not until Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life
& Cas. Co., 404 U.S. (1971) that the Court expressly recognized the validity of
DEFINING FEDERAL SECURITIESJanuary 19741
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Where does that leave us today9 The Supreme Court has been
silent since 1967 on this question and the composition of the Court has
changed during that period. There are two different types of activity
in the forefront which could provide further assistance.5° First there
is a series of decisions by other courts, both before and after 1967,
which make eventual Supreme Court review likely;51 second, a blue
ribbon panel of experts is drafting and debating a proposed model
Federal Securities Code. 52
To date, the second avenue has been a great disappointment
to those who had hoped for some resolution of the definitional ques-
tions. Many of the nation's foremost securities experts have simply
thrown up their hands and left future developments in this area to be
determined by the courts on a case-by-case basis. 53  While a black
letter formula would be undesirable for the reasons set forth above in
the implied private civil antifraud action under Rule 10b-5. Nevertheless, although
Tcherepnn was a private iOb-5 action, the Court did consider the effect of an exemp-
tion from registration and did conclude that the history of the exemption was useful
in defining the term "security" in an implied private civil action. Thus, it may very
well be that the definitions for the purposes of registration and antifraud considerations
are identical and that no distinction is to be drawn between the definitions to be ap-
plied in implied civil remedy actions, express civil remedy actions, and regulatory en-
forcement. A different result may obtain if the Supreme Court should accept the "con-
text" statutory construction argument discussed m the text accompanying notes 216-
221 infra.
50. There is also a third possibility, namely, the SEC no action interpretive letters
which are now publicly available. However, this seems an unlikely source of further
definition for various reasons. First, the interest of the SEC is different in granting
no action status with respect to registration than it is with respect to its antifraud en-
forcement. Second, the format of the no action letter is such that the applicant's
counsel makes the best argument he can for exemption and the SEC response is often
to the effect that if the transaction is as characterized by the applicant, it will recom-
mend no action. There is some analogy between this procedure and the action of the
Justice Department in reviewing competitive mergers in the antitrust field in which a
favorable review is clearly not a bar to subsequent antimerger suits.
51. For example, in the pyramid sales and multilevel distributorship cases, differ-
ent results are being obtained in different circuits on the same facts. See SEC v. Glenn
W Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W
3189 (U.S. Oct. 9, 1973); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., [Current Binder] CCH
FED. Sac. L. REP. 93,960, at 93,844 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 19, 1973). See text accompa-
nying note 156 infra.
52. A.L.I., FED. SEc. CODE, (Tent. Draft No. 1, April 1972).
53. "This section [definition of security] should be changed as little as possible,
both because there is now a considerable body of jurisprudence and because it was sub-
stantially followed in the Uniform Securities Act, so that there is now a degree of
uniformity at both state and federal levels. On the other hand, there are a number
of defects in the language, none of which affects the terms, 'investment contract' and
'certificate of interest or participation in a profit-sharing agreement,' which have been
the subject of most of the litigation." Id. § 297, at 52, Comment.
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discussing Justice Murphy's Howey test, some analytic guidance
would be helpful. Perhaps that guidance may yet be forthcoming
since the code is now only in its second tenative draft. This article
will focus upon the developing judicial treatment of the term "security."
Two Important Decisions of Other Courts
There are a great many decisions of state and federal courts dealing
with the term security. Two of these decisions are reviewed here, as
they assume current importance for purposes of analyzing the Su-
preme Court's prior decisions.
Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski
The Supreme Court of California, in an opinion by its distin-
guished jurist Roger Traynor, made the first major departure from the
solidly entrenched Howey doctrine. Silver Hills Country Club v. Sob-
ieski" involved a partnership which sought to fund the development
of a golf and country club by offering "memberships." 55  A member-
ship included rights, revocable only for misbehavior or failure to pay
dues, to the use of club facilities. The venture was grossly under-
capitalized. The promoters provided a down payment of $400 under a
contract to purchase a $75,000 ranch, and proposed to raise an addi-
tional $165,000 for construction costs through this mode of outside fi-
nancing. Realizing that the risk of loss was certain to rest almost exclu-
sively on the public, John Sobieski, then the California commissioner of
corporations, issued a desist and refrain order for failure to comply
with the California corporate securities code.' 6 The plaintiffs sought
judicial review, alleging that the memberships were not securities be-
cause they conveyed no rights in the assets or income of the club, and
because they were purchased, not as an investment, but for the per-
sonal enjoyment of the vendee. Applying Howey literally, the plaintiffs
were correct. Even though the public had invested the money and re-
mained m passive reliance on the efforts of the promoters, there was
no expectation of profit.
54. 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961).
55. ' They plan to sell a total of 200 'charter memberships' for $150 each,
thereby raising $30,000; 300 memberships for $200 each, thereby raising $60,000; and
500 memberships for $250 each, thereby raising $75,000 [sic]." 1d. at 812-13, 361 P.2d
at 907, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
56. CAL. CoRP. CODE § 25514 (West 1955). 'Whenever m the opinion of the
commissioner the further sale of any securities by any company would be unfair, unjust
or inequitable to the purchasers of the securities, the commissioner may order the
company to desist and to refrain from the further sale of its securities."
January 1974]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Instead of making techmcal distinctions, Justice Traynor treated
the issue as one of first impression. He found that the membership fit-
ted within the literal defimtion of a "beneficial interest in title to prop-
erty,"5 7 but more importantly he concluded that the scheme fell within
the regulatory purpose of the Blue Sky law
[Ilts [the corporate securities code] objective is to afford those
who risk their capital at least a fair chance of realizing their ob-
jectives in legitimate ventures whether or not they expect a return
on their capital in one form or another.58
This terse statement contains two revolutionary concepts: expec-
tation of a nonmaterial benefit and risk capital.59 By emphasizing
the regulatory purpose of the Blue Sky law, the Silver Hills court felt
comfortable in easing the traditional requirement that investment con-
tracts contain an element of pecumary return. Significantly, the
court was aided in reaching this conclusion by the language of the
California statute, which includes noninterest bearing debt instruments
of nonprofit corporations within the definition of a security I"
[T]he act extends even to transactions where capital is placed
without expectation of any matenal benefits. Thus from its ex-
emption of securities of certain nonprofit companies, the act spe-
cifically excepts "notes, bonds, debentures, or other evidence of
indebtedness, whether interest-bearing or not."61
This language, which some suggest is dicta,62 certainly repre-
57 CAL. COrn" CODE § 25019 (West Supp. 1973).
58. 55 Cal. 2d at 815, 361 P.2d at 909, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
59. Whether these concepts are truly "revolutionary" m a strictly legal sense is
probably open to debate. Some writers believe this was a radical departure. "Until
Silver Hills, with one exception [Davenport v. U.S., 260 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1958)
(fraud conviction)], every state and federal, case which considered whether a member-
ship or interest m property constituted a security, found either an expectation of profit
to the investor or evidence of an indebtedness." Note, Franchise Regulation under the
California Corporate Securities Law, 5 SAN DIEGO L. Rav. 140, 151 (1968). "Silver
Hills is apparently a case of first impressions not only m California, but in the entire na-
tion." 50 CALIF. L. REv. 156, 158 (1962); accord, 14 HASTINGS L.J. 181 (1962). But
see Long, supra note 4, at 168-70, wherein the author concludes that the roots of the
risk capital concept date back to Browne Oil Co. v. Railroad Comm'r, 207 Wis. 88, 240
N.W 827 (1932).
60. Except as expressly provided below, the California Corporate Securities Code
is inapplicable to the following classes of securities:
"(a) Any security (except evidences of indebtedness, whether interest bearng or not)
of an issuer (1) organized exclusively for educational, benevolent, fraternal, religious,
charitable, social, or reformatory purposes and not for pecuniary profit, if no part of the
net earnings of the issuer inures to the benefit of any pnvate shareholder or indi-
vidual. " CAL. CORP CODE § 25100 (West Supp. 1973).
61. Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d at 815, 361 P.2d at 908, 13
Cal. Rptr. at 188 (court's emphasis).
62. It has been suggested that Silver Hills did contain an element of expected
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sents a departure from the language contained in over thirty years of
state and federal decisions. It should be clear, however, that "profit
motive" is not irrelevant;63 it is still an indication of a security. What
Silver Hills does say, however, is that the absence of a profit motive
does not provide a shield for the unscrupulous promoter who seeks
to finance his operation by public solicitation of risk capital. Silver
Hills thus represents a departure from the Howey formula with re-
spect to the profit prong of the test. At the same time, the type of
promotional scheme in question was not dissimilar to the one in Howey.
The country club in Silver Hills was to be a profit making venture for
the promoters with the venture to be financed through the use of money
gained from -the uninformed and unsophisticated public, as with the cit-
rus groves in Howey and the oil leases in Joiner. This concept of fi-
nancing through the obtaining of risk capital from the public is parti-
cularly important where the transaction involves a benefit other than
a pecuniary return.
SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc.
SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc.,64 involved an enter-
prise commonly known as a pyramid operation. In Glenn Turner,
defendants purported to market self-improvement courses through a
multilevel network of independent distributors. The substance of
defendants' scheme, however, was the sale of distributorships, not
goods. The purchase of a distributorship entitled the investor to a
commission or finder's fee for each new distributor he was able to re-
cruit. These payments would multiply geometrically as the new recruit
in turn recruited additional salesmen. Because of the basic instabil-
ity and mathematical impossibility of a pyramid operation, the structure
ultimately collapses, benefiting only those at the top of the pyramid.
The most pernicious aspect of this operation is the recruiting program.
Prospective salesmen, aroused by the prospect of easy money, are per-
suaded to attend "adventure meetings." These gatherings take on the
profit in the form of an "entrance privilege." Coffey, supra note 4, at 402-03.
Although the lawyer-like quality of this argument cannot be demed, it is highly
unlikely that either the litigants or the court conceived of the scheme m this light.
Iustice Traynor spoke directly to the threshold issue of nonpecumary benefits.
63. See text accompanying notes 81-86 infra.
64. 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W 3189 (U.S. Oct. 9, 1973).
Defendant Glenn Turner purported to market a line of self-improvement courses known
as "Dare to be Great" ("DARE"). To avoid confusion, the reader should be cognizant
of the fact that the court refers variously to defendants as "Glenn Turner," "Dare to
be Great," and "DARE."
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evangelistic characteristics of old religious revival meetings. Sharp
practices are utilized to pressure predominantly poor and unsophisti-
cated individuals into parting with their meager savings. 65 Although
this type of fraud has been uniformly condemned by the courts,66 the
question facing the Ninth Circuit was whether or not this scheme in-
volved a security
The investor in Glenn Turner was not wholly passive. As the
court observed,
[The purchaser] must himself exert some effort if he is to realize
a return on his initial cash outlay. He must find prospects and
persuade them to attend Dare Adventure Meetings, and at least
some of them must then purchase a plan if he is to realize that
return. Thus it can be said that the returns or profits are not
coming "solely" from the efforts of others.
67
Since "solely from the efforts of others" is an integral part of the
Howey test, a literal interpretation would have precluded the finding of
an investment contract. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit refused to al-
low the defendants to hide behind this language.
We hold, however, that m light of the remedial nature of the
legislation, the statutory policy of affording broad protection to the
public, and the Supreme Court's admonitions that the definition
of securities should be a flexible one, the word "solely" should
not be read as a strict or literal limitation on the definition of an
investment contract, but rather must be construed realistically,
so as to include within the definition those schemes which involve
in substance, if not form, securities. 68
The court went on to note that several state courts69 had re-
cently considered similar transactions and had chosen to criticize the
mechaical interpretation of "solely" in favor of enjoining the pyramid
65. Id. at 478-80.
66. For example, in a case based on nearly identical facts, the district court ob-
served: "In reviewing the record in this case, it is plain that defendants' program is
a get-rich-quick scheme in the worst sense. Poor, unwary persons have been induced
by high-pressure sales tactics to part with their money, and a very few have harvested
the large returns they were led to believe were common for those participating in the
program. Gross, intentional fraud may well be involved. Nonetheless, the court is
not entirely convinced that defendants' operation, outrageous as it may be, actually
involves the sale or offer of sale of securities within the meaning of the federal Acts."
SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 93,960,
at 93,845 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 19, 1973).
67. 474 F.2d at 482.
68. Id.
69. Frye v. Taylor, 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 71,020 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. Mar. 8,
1972); State ex rel. Park v. Glenn Turner Enterprises, Inc., 3 BLUE SKY L. REP
71,023 (Dist. Ct. Idaho Mar. 28, 1972); see Hurst v. Dare-to-be Great, Inc., Civ. No.
71-160 D. Ore. Jan. 12, 1972), rev'd as to damages, 474 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1973).
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operation. Finally, the Ninth Circuit announced that henceforth the
efforts of others would be construed in a qualitative sense: "[W]e
adopt a more realistic test, whether the efforts made by those other
than the investor are the undeniably significant ones, those essential
managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the enter-
prise."' 70 Even though the investor was an active participant in this
scheme, the court cogently observed that what he invested in was a
"share in the proceeds of the selling efforts of DARE."'71  In other
words, instead of analyzing the problem simply in terms of investor
participation, the court examined how meaningful the investor's ef-
forts were designed to be with reference to the scheme.
Those efforts [DARE's] are the sine qua non of the scheme;
those efforts are what keeps it going; those efforts are what pro-
duces the money which is to make him rich. In essence, it is
the right to share in the proceeds of those efforts that he buys.
In our view, the scheme is no less an investment contract merely
because he contributes some effort as well as money to get into
it. 72
As will be seen in testing other commercial transactions, this
change in emphasis from the quantum of effort to the lack of signifi-
cant control is particularly important. Thus, in two key cases, two
prongs of the Howey test have come under attack. In Silver Hills, as
a matter of state corporate securities law, the profit prong was elimi-
nated in favor of a risk analysis and the reaping of a material benefit
other than profit. In Glenn Turner the "solely from the efforts of oth-
ers" prong was redefined through a balancing process.
A reasonable argument can be advanced that these decisions go
far to recall the Joiner decision, whereby rekindled policy considera-
tions will provide little comfort to the purveyors of worthless promises.
The use of the risk capital concept and of policy considerations hope-
fully has nurtured the continued growth of a broad, flexible doctrine
capable of being adapted to evolving investment schemes.
An Analytic Framework
Having reviewed two encroachments upon the Howey formula,
together with the indication of the Supreme Court that the defimtion
of the term security should not be narrowly construed, the question be-
comes: How does one analyze a promotional scheme to determine
whether it involves a security?
70. 474 F.2d at 482 (emphasis added).
71. Id.
72. Id.
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The following is an appraisal of the fundamental concepts under-
lying those promotional schemes which are likely to involve securities.
These concepts are compared and contrasted with the current state of
the law for the purpose of understanding the direction the definition
may take in the future.
The problem with the Howey formula is not that it is wrong, but
that it is often applied restrictively without recognizing that it is merely
a statement of a result based upon the facts in the Howey case. The
following analytic framework is based partly upon a Howey-type anal-
ysis, together with a recognition of post-Howey developments, with-
out any direct attempt to limit the analysis strictly to "investment con-
tracts." The framework consists of seven questions. There is no
magic in that number, nor are the questions intended to be exclusive.
They are at best a starting point.
1 What is the participant asked to contribute to the enterprise?
The investor must supply some consideration; Howey spoke of
money, presumably cash. There seems to be no analytic reason, how-
ever, to suggest that Justice Murphy purposely excluded the investor
who furmshes property or services. Any distinction based upon con-
ditions which may accompany the property or services goes to the na-
ture of the expectation of return, or to the control exercised, not to
the furnishing of valuable consideration. Perhaps this is an academic
point, because promoters are generally interested in money Some-
times, however, the transaction requires two steps. For example, the
investor may be required to purchase a shipping container which is then
turned over to the promoter to be managed with others under his com-
mon control. Such a purchase would be the price of admission and the
furnishing of the container would be the substantial equivalent of sup-
plying money "
2. Is there in substance a common enterprise?
Common enterprise should be liberally construed to mean any
type of concerted effort whereby the investor's financial interests are
"inextricably interwoven"74 with those of the promoter or third party -,
73. Professor Long thoughtfully deals with this topic under the heading of
"Money or Money's Worth." See Long, supra note 4, at 161-62.
74. This phrase derives from the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Los Angeles Trust
Deed & Mortgage Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1961).
75. For an excellent discussion of common enterprise, see Continental Marketing
Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1967).
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In other words, the element of commonality is vertical between buyer
and seller-not horizontal-among investors similarly situated, as
some courts76 have interpreted the Howey decision. Thus, in Maheu
v. Reynolds & Co.77 the court held that a discretionary commodities ac-
count, managed and supervised solely by defendants, constituted an
investment contract, notwithstanding the fact that plaintiffs account
was not pooled with that of other investors. 8
Likewise, common enterprise should not be confused with the re-
quirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 2379 that class actions
must involve common questions of law and fact. In other words, a
class action theory might be thwarted if a promoter offered a different
scheme to different investors. In that case, the investors' claims
would lack commonality. This failure, however, would not preclude
each individual investor from maintaining a securities claim on his
own behalf, since a separate common enterprise would exist between
each investor and the promoter.
It is also important to note that common enterprise is not limited
to a single legal entity. The gist of common enterprise is the inter-
weaving of economic interests. Thus, the presence or absence of a
legal entity or a number of legal entities is irrelevant in determining
the existence of a common enterprise."
3. Is the participant led to expect a profit?
The Howey opinion speaks in terms of the expectation of "prof-
its." While this term has been severely criticized when relied upon
as a nindispensable attribute of investment contracts (and rightly so if
rigidly construed),"' it is submitted that there is evidentiary and analy-
tic meaning in that term. As Professor Coffey states:
76. Dame v. Lee, 180 Ga. 315, 178 S.E. 752 (1935).
77. 282 F Supp. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
78. "The joint account may constitute a security even if there was no pooling
arrangement or common enterprise among investors." Id. at 429. The "pooling" prob-
lem may be more imagined than real. The Maheu decision is typical of and in accord
with the clear weight of authority. See 1 Loss, supra note 6, at 489 n.86.
79. "Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue
or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous
that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typi-
cal of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class." FFD. R. Crv. P. 23(a) (emphasis
added).
80. For a more detailed discussion, see Long, supra note 4, at 163-64.
81. E.g., State ex rel Comm'r of Sec. v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii
642, 651, 485 P.2d 105, 110 (1971).
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The requirement seems sound; securities regulation does not ap-
pear to be necessarily appropriate for all types of transactions in
which the buyer's initial value is subjected to the risk of an enter-
prise. For example, the SEC has indicated that it would not or-
dinarily consider the term "security" to embrace trading stamps,
streetcar tokens, meal tickets, Christmas gift certificates, box tops,
or theater tickets. 82
The term "profits" should not be construed restrictive. It is apparent
from decisions subsequent to Howey that the return promised for the
use of the investors' money may be something other than a share of
the profits of an enterprise in a narrow accounting sense. It is true
that Howey dealt with a situation where the investor had the equivalent
of an equity interest m the common enterprise, but where the investment
offered is of a different nature, the promised return will necessarily vary.
For example, market price appreciation in value, though not profit in a
commercial sense, was the significant factor in the investment contract
recognized by the Supreme Court in SEC v. Variable Annuity Life
Insurance Co. of America 8 and SEC v. United Benefit Life Insurance
Co. 4 The profits involved in Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage
Exchange v SEC 5 consisted of interest payments received on notes se-
cured by trust deeds. Furthermore, the existence of a security does not
necessarily depend upon the investor having an interest in the enterprise
as a whole. Indeed, in Joiner6 the Supreme Court held that a security
existed where each investor was sold a specific interest m oil leases, an
interest which was not owned in common with other investors or pro-
moters. Since the profit expected by each individual investor was the
appreciation in the market price of his individual acreage, there was no
identity of his profits with those of the promoters. Therefore, in under-
standing the term "profits" reference can be made to distributions which
are fixed, variable, conditioned upon, or unrelated to the profits as re-
flected in the balance sheet of the enterprise.
87
4 How does the promoter characterize his promotion?
Promoters represented by competent counsel are not likely to
make their offerings sound like securities. Although from a sales
82. Coffey, supra note 4, at 399 (emphasis added). See also Sperry & Hutchin-
son Co. v. Hudson, 190 Ore. 458, 226 P.2d 501 (1951) (ordinary retail trading stamps
were held not to constitute securities under the state securities statute).
83. 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
84. 387 U.S. 202 (1967).
85. 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1960).
86. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
87. However, the profit element may not be required if the scheme is a risk cap-
ital scheme. See discussion of risk capital in text accompanying notes 87-118; infra.
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standpoint there is a great incentive to do so, such a characterization
runs directly into the often cited language of Justice Jackson in SEC
v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp.:"8
The test... is what character the instrument is given in com-
merce by the terms of the offer, the plan of distribution, and
the economic inducements held out to the prospect. In the en-
forcement of an act such as this it is not inappropriate that the
promoters' offerings be judged as being what they were repre-
sented to be.89
Despite the broad sweep of this language, it is submitted that pro-
motional representations should be construed solely as an evidentiary
matter. In other words, if the seller represents something as a se-
curity which is clearly not a security, federal jurisdiction cannot be
founded upon his erroneous conclusion. By the same token, if the
seller should color his promotions of a security with representations
that it is not a security, he has done nothing to put himself beyond the
reach of the securities laws. This position is best illustrated by em-
ploying an analogy to the familiar declaration against interest ex-
ception to the hearsay rule. For example, in United Benefit Life,
Justice Harlan recited the above mentioned paragraph in Joiner and
added:
Contracts such as the "Flexible Fund" offer important competition
to mutual funds . . . and are pitched to the same consumer in-
terest in growth through professionally managed investment. It
seems eminently fair that a purchaser of such a plan be afforded
88. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
89. Id. at 352-53 (emphasis added).
Professor Loss has suggested that this is closely analagous to the more recent and
more publicized Supreme Court holding ma Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463
(1966). 4 Loss, supra note 6, at 2497 (Supp. 1969). In Ginzburg, the Court stated:
"We agree that the question of obscenity may include consideration of the setting in
which the publications were presented as an aid to determining the question of obscen-
ity, and assume without deciding that the prosecution could not have succeeded other-
wise." 383 U.S. at 465-66.
The Ginzburg opinion dealt with "pandering" and the means used to promote
obscenity. Without regard to the wisdom of the test as applied to the obscenity laws,
it is an appropriate device in analyzing whether the scheme constitutes a security.
Professor Loss states that "this analysis is invited by the reference in section 2(1)
to 'any interest or instrument commonly known as a "security""' 4 Loss, supra note
6, at 2497 (Supp. 1969).
There is no question the courts place heavy emphasis on the promoter's represen-
tations. See Farrell v. United States, 321 F.2d 409, 415-16 (9th Cir. 1963); Roe v.
United States, 287 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1961); SEC v. Royal Hawaiian Management
Corp., [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] CCH FFD. SEc. L. REP. 1 91,982, at 96,338 (C.D.
Cal. 1967); ef. 1 Loss, supra note 6, at 511-12 (forged securities). See also Seeman
v. United States, 90 F.2d 88 (5th Cir. 1937).
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the same advantages of disclosure which inure to a mutual fund
purchaser under Section 5 of the Securities Act.90
Justice Harlan is not suggesting that bald sales representations
were a sufficient basis for finding an investment contract. The
thrust of his statement is that the defendants were taking a contrary
position in court to the position which they had previously taken in
their sales literature. In determining whether or not a security was in-
volved, these earlier statements against their present interest were con-
sidered as "some evidence" against them. On the other hand, if de-
fendants had represented their "Flexible Fund" as a stable and se-
cure annuity, it is doubtful that this would have had a material effect
in defending against the SEC's position. That is, although both kinds
of representations should be considered as evidence, their relative weight
is substantially different. The point is that as with a declaration against
interest, the courts are likely to find sufficient trustworthiness in a state-
ment which makes the promotion sound like a security to swing a
close case against the promoter.91
The terms of the offer are extremely important for another reason.
The 1933 Act speaks in terms of offer or sale of a security 92 Thus,
if the investor has been offered, alternatively, either active managerial
control over his investment, or a merely passive interest, both Howey
and Joiner indicate that there has been an offer of an unregistered se-
curity This is true notwithstanding the fact that the investor chose
to purchase the active alternative which would itself not constitute the
sale of security
90. 387 U.S. at 211.
91. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5347 (Jan. 10, 1973) provides an excellent
example of the strong weight given to the promoter's representations. The release of-
fers guidelines with respect to the applicability of federal securities laws to the offer
and sale of condominiums or other units in a real estate development. In many situa-
tions, condominiums are offered with collateral arrangements such as a rental pool,
exclusive rental agents, or restrictions on occupancy and rental so that in substance
the offeror is offenng an opportunity through which the purchaser may earn a return
on his investment through the managerial efforts of the promoters or a third party
in their operation of the enterprise. Noting the wide variety of these arrangements,
the SEC has stated that "condominiums, coupled with a rental arrangement, will be
deemed to be securities if they are offered and sold through advertising, sales literature,
promotional schemes or oral representations which emphasize the economic benefits to
the purchaser to be derived from the managerial efforts of the promoter or a third
party designated or arranged by the promoter in renting the units." Id.
92. "The term 'sale' or 'sel' shall include every contract of sale or disposition
of a security or interest in a security, for value. The term 'offer to sell', 'offer for
sale', or 'offer' shall include every attempt or offer to dispose of, or solictation of an
offer to buy, a security or interest in a security, for value." 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3)
(1970).
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5. Where does the risk of loss from the transaction fall?
The risk of loss concept is central to an understanding of the se-
curities concept. Too often this principle is overlooked as a result of
overemphasis on the "expectation of profit" language in the Howey
opinon. One need only look to the earlier Joiner decision to recog-
nize that the case turned not so much on the promoters' representa-
tions of profit as on the economic reality that the risk of loss had been
placed on the shoulders of the investors.
By selling from 1,000 to 2,000 acres at $5.00 to $15.00 per
acre, he [Joiner] could fulfill his obligation to drill the well, re-
coup his incidental expenses and those of the selling intermedi-
aries, and have a thousand acres left for the gamble, with no in-
vestment of his own; and if he sold more, he would have a present
profit. Without the drilling of the well, no one's leases had any
value, and except for that undertaking they [the leases] had been
obtained [by Joiner] at no substantial cost. The well was neces-
sary not only to fulfill the hopes of purchasers but apparently even
to avoid the forfeiture of the leases.
* . It is clear that an economic interest in this well-drilling un-
dertaking was what brought into being the instruments that the de-
fendants were selling and gave to the instruments most of their
value and all of their lure. The trading in these documents had
all the evils inherent in the securities -transactions which it was
the aim of the Securities Act to end.93
As Professor Coffey observed of the Joiner opinion, "The Court's
concern is clearly focused on the relationship between the success of
the enterprise and the preservation or deterioration of the value which
the buyer originally furnished in the alleged security transaction.
' 94
Similarly, the Supreme Court's concern in VALIC and United Benefit
Life was clearly directed at the insurer's attempt to shift all or a
substantial portion of the risk of loss to the investor. 5 Therefore,
in determining whether or not a security is involved in a particular
transaction, analysis of the type, character, and allocation of the risk
of loss provides a reliable barometer. 6
93. 320 U.S. at 349 (emphasis added).
94. Coffey, supra note 4, at 381 (partial emphasis added).
95. See discussion of these decisions m text accompanying notes 32-42 supra.
96. This is so because risk analysis involves a broadly based inquiry which in-
cludes a consideration of the economic realities. For example, the scope of the risk
is contingent to a great degree on the quality of investor control over his investments.
The more dependent the investor becomes on another, the less able he is to protect
his investment and the greater the risk. Additionally, the existence of a common enter-
prise, the presence or absence of a profit motive, and the representations made by the
promoter are factors to be considered in analyzing the risk. Thus, the term risk is
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Risk analysis is also helpful in distinguishing between normal
"commercial" risks, which lie outside the purview of the acts, and in-
vestment type risks, which fall within the defimtion of the term se-
curity
The reality of our market place is that nearly all businesses ul-
timately finance themselves by obtaining public finds through the sale
of goods or services. Whenever some future performance is promised
to the customer of an enterprise, there is the commercial risk that the
promisor will not perform or that the intervening insolvency of the
promisor will prevent or delay the performance. These types of "nor-
mal" commercial risks, without more, do not shift the principal risk to
the customer. How, then, does one differentiate between various en-
terprises in which the public provides consideration to determine which
enterprises fall within the definition of the term security7 The answer
lies in an analysis of risk as a matter of economic reality Whether
the transaction looks like the sale of a finished product (variable an-
nuities, withdrawable capital shares, dealerships, club memberships)
or an interim product in a larger scheme (oil leases, undivided in-
terests in an orange grove) is less important than is the determination
of who, in reality, bears the principal risk of loss.
There is no magic formula for determining the principal risk,
but a similar analysis is required to be made within an analogous
area of the securities laws. Section 4(2) of the 1933 Act97 provides
an exemption from registration for "private offerings" without further
guidelines for ascertaining what transactions fall within the scope of that
exemption. In a landmark decision, SEC v Ralston Purina Co.,98 the
Supreme Court indicated that the exemption from registration was not
capable of being reduced to a numerical formula. The Court in a six
to two decision by Justice Clark reversed the court of appeals and
stated:
[T]he statute would seem to apply to a "public offering" whether
to a few or many. It may well be that offerings to a substantial
number of persons would rarely be exempt. Indeed, nothing
prevents the commission, in enforcing the statute, from using some
kind of numerical test in deciding when to investigate particular
exemption claims. But there is no warrant for superimposing a
not a separate element, but the product of a combination of factors which make up
the important characteristics of a security.
97. 15 U.S.C. § 577d(2) (1970). "The provisions of section 77e of this title
[registration] shall not apply to transactions by an issuer not involving any public
offering."
98. 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
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quantity limit on private offerings as a matter of statutory inter-
pretation.
Keeping in mind the broadly remedial purposes of federal
securities legislation, imposition of the burden of proof on an is-
suer who would plead the exemption seems to us fair and rea-
sonable. . . Agreeing, the court below thought the burden met
primarily because of the respondent's purpose in singling out its
key employees for stock offerings. But once it is seen that the
exemption question turns on the knowledge of the offerees, the
issuer's motives, laudable though they may be, fade into irrele-
vance. The focus of inquiry should be on the need of the of-
ferees for the protections afforded by registration.99
The SEC relying on Ralston Purina, issued a release providing
guidelines for ascertaining the availability of the private offering ex-
emption. The release states: "Whether a transaction is one not in-
volving any public offering is essentially a question of fact and neces-
sitates a consideration of all surrounding circumstances, including such
factors as the relationship between the offerees and the issuer, the
nature, scope, size, type and manner of the offering." 100  Similarly, as
a matter of defining a security, the location of the principal risk is a
question of fact to be determined by reference to all the surrounding
circumstances.
One is often able to gain a greater insight into the economic
realities of the transaction by focusing on how and for what purpose
the scheme was designed. For instance, the recent increase in the
price of gold on the world market prompted some Americans to at-
tempt to participate indirectly in the price increase by purchasing large
quantities of the cheaper varieties of rare gold coins. Corn dealers
who operate as a brokerage medium and nothing more in these transac-
tions are probably not in violation of the securities laws. In other
words, so long as these dealers act as a mere "conduit" without more,
and simply "pass on" the investment risk of the world gold market to
the public, they have done nothing to alter or reallocate the risk of loss.
On the other hand, if an undercapitalized entity should interpose it-
self in the midst of the investment risk which emanates from the market-
place, and offer, for example, unhedged ninety-day options on twenty
dollar gold pieces, the risk of loss would be fundamentally altered. No
longer would the coin buyer's investment be subject merely to the exi-
gencies of the marketplace; rather, the investor's risk of loss would be
99. Id. at 125-27 (emphasis added).
100. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552.
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fully contingent upon the changing fortunes of his optionor, much as
if he had purchased stock in the enterprise. Utilizing risk analysis, and
taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it would appear that
since the scheme was designed for the purpose of obtaining venture
capital from the public and was operated in such a manner that the risk
of loss was shifted to the public, the erstwhile investor became the fi-
nancier of the enterprise and was entitled to the protection of the se-
curities laws. In other words, where the principal risk has been allocated
to the public as it was in Joiner, VALIC, and United Benefit Life,
reference to the Howey formula should be unnecessary 101
6. Is the participant's contribution risk capital?
Risk capital is a specific kind of risk analysis relating to the pro-
viding of venture capital by the participants. Silver Hills, the genesis of
the risk capital concept, is different from United Benefit Life in that the
concern of the California Supreme Court was with the capitalization of
the country club, while the United States Supreme Court in United
Benefit Life was concerned not with the provision of capital for the
venture, but with the undisclosed risk of loss to the participants in the
variable annuity plan. Joiner and Glenn Turner each display elements
of both risk and risk capital analysis. In Joiner, the promotion of the
leaseholds was the vehicle by which venture capital would have been
raised to drill the oil well. The investors were therefore directly
responsible for financing the enterprise and would bear the risk of loss.
In Glenn Turner, insufficient capitalization from an endless chain and
risk of loss at the ever-extending base of the pyramid were both present.
Glenn Turner is difficult to analyze as a risk capital case because the
amount of capital required for the endlessly expanding pyramid was
elusive, if not illusory From a risk standpoint, however, the risk was
clearly on the investor at the bottom of an inverted funnel winch drew
money to those at the top.
In Silver Hills, Justice Traynor refined the risk capital concept by
specifically limiting his analysis:
As a general rule, the sale of 'securities' that is condemned by
the courts involves an attempt by an issuer to raise funds for a
business venture or enterprise; an indiscriminate offering to the
public at large where the persons solicited are selected at ran-
101. On the other hand, should the scheme encompass the four factors of Howey,
at this late date there is little doubt that an investment contract exists without reference
to risk.
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dom; a passive position on the part of the investor; and the con-
duct of the enterprise by the issuer with other people's money.'
02
In other words, the securities acts are designed in part to operate
in situations amounting to venture capital offerings. This is the grava-
men of the risk capital concept. In these situations, the investment
return requirement may be relaxed.
This relationship is extremely important because a major mis-
take of many writers 0 3 and a prospective trap for many courts is the
erroneous assumption that Silver Hills stands for the proposition that
the unqualified expectation of a valuable benefit alone is sufficient to
constitute an investment contract and thereby to circumvent the profit
element of Howey The reason that this analysis must fail is easily seen
once Howey absent the profit element is extended to its logical conclu-
sion. As discussed previously, whenever a customer of an enterprise
has been promised some future performance, the fulfillment of that
promise necessarily rests upon the willingness and capability of the
promisor to perform. If the valuable benefit concept were mdiscrim-
mately adopted, it would be tantamount to extending the securities acts
to virtually every executory contract. Importantly, Silver Hills did not
involve every risk contingency found in executory contracts, but was
limited to venture capital offerings.
Thus construed, the valuable benefit concept and the risk capital
theory are not separate and distinct; they are, in fact, two sides of the
same coin.'0 4 Severing "benefit" from "risk capital" drains the via-
102. 55 Cal. 2d at 814, 361 P.2d at 908, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188, citing Dahlquist,
Regulation and Civil Liability Under the California Corporate Securities Act, 33 CALIF.
L. R v. 343, 360 (1945). While Silver Hills speaks of "public offerings," that matter
is handled within the Federal Securities Laws by an exemption from registration, sec-
tion 4(1) of the 1933 Act, rather than by the definition of the term "security." Thus
an investor m a "private offering" could still assert a federal securities claim pursuant
to the antifraud sections.
103. "The third part of the Howey test was the expectation of profits. The
proposed rule makes clear that the benefit is intended to be to the investor and
by using the general word 'benefit' eliminates any possibility of narrow interpretation.
Beyond this it recognizes the idea developed by the Silver Hills case that the benefit
does not have to be either tangible or material. The Howey test of profits, if used
in a general sense, and properly applied to the return to the investor, will cover a
large portion of securities cases. The proposed test merely expands and clarifies it
so that all securities are covered. Long, supra note 6, at 175-76.
104. Professor Coffey hints at this relationship: "Nevertheless, two generalities
may safely be stated about the relationship between risk to initial value and the rea-
sonable expectation of 'profit' First, both factors are necessary in most securities trans-
actions. Second, as the degree of risk to initial value increases, the need for a well-
defined 'profit' motive lessens; i.e., the elements of risk to initial value and reasonable
expectation of profits are on a sliding scale of inverse proportionality." Coffey, supra
note 6, at 401.
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bility of each. However, employed in tandem, the twin concepts of-
fer a potent weapon against those who would hide behind neat distinc-
tions in the language of Howey This fire power is not supplied out
of judicial craftsmanship; rather, it is derived from the fundamental
legislative policy of protecting individuals from being victimized by
venture capital offerings in whatever form they may be clothed. 10 5  As
Justice Traynor noted:
The purchasers' risk is not lessened merely because the interest
he purchases is labelled a membership. Only because he risks his
capital along with other purchasers can there be any chance that
the benefits of club membership will materialize. 10 6
The next crucial inquiry is whether federal law can be rational-
ized together with Silver Hills. It is possible, of course, for state and
federal law to co-exist in irreconcilable disharmony For instance,
a reasonable argument can be made that under the paternalistic "fair,
just and equitable standard,"'1 7  California, through its corporations
commissioner, has the right to protect California citizens from operations
financed on a shoestring whether they know it or not. On the other
hand, the federal full disclosure type of statute does not permit the
luxury of segregating schemes which are bad bargains from those which
are good bargains. Admitting the substantiality of that argument,
one could still contend that no definitive answer has yet been issued at
the federal level. However, a careful reading of the two Supreme
Court variable annuity cases, VALIC l0 8 and United Benefit Life,0 9
shows that the Court was making an analysis which is analytically sim-
ilar to a risk capital analysis."10 In these cases, the risk of success or
105. "Silver Hills has considerably expanded the concept of 'securities' in Califor-
ma. In de-emphasizing the 'profit motive' test, the Supreme Court has consequently
emphasized that the nature of the investment interest, and the liberal purpose of the
Corporate Securities Act, can be used exclusively in protecting investment ventures.
[W]here profit is not the motive for investment, the courts can look at the degree
of risk to the investor. If the person is risking his capital in some type of fraudulent
or questionable investment scheme, the court can apply the rule in Silver Hills to reach
an equitable result." 14 HASTrNGS L.J. 181, 184 (1962).
106. 55 Cal. 2d at 815, 361 P.2d at 908, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
107 CAL. CORP CODE § 25140(a) (West Supp. 1973). For a general discussion
of the contrast between full disclosure and the "fair, just and equitable" standard, see
Long, supra note 6, at 159-60.
108. 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
109. 387 U.S. 202 (1967).
110. At first blush it might appear that a contrary argument could be made,
based upon the language in Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967) and SEC v.
W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). In Tcherepnin, the Court stated: "As was
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failure fell upon the purchasers. Although there is a profit incentive
in the variable annuity cases, it is entirely consistent to view venture
capital promoters such as Silver Hills under the same basic risk analy-
sis. It is submitted that where the promoter in substance is conducting
his business with other people's money at their risk, the courts can find
an expressed federal policy of the securities act to protect the investor
from this type of venture capital offering, notwithstanding the absence
of a conventional profit motive.
The aim is to prevent further exploitation of the public by the
sale of unsound, fraudulent and worthless securities through mis-
representation; to place adequate and true information before the
investor; to protect honest enterprise, seeking capital by honest
presentation, against the competition afforded by dishonest se-
curities offered to the public through crooked promotion . . ."I'l
Some evidence of this policy is apparent in an example previously
noted. Professor Coffey was quoted above1 2 as expressing approval
of the SEC's decision to cull from the securities concept such instru-
ments as trading stamps, streetcar tokens, and Christmas gift certifi-
cates. In these situations there is generally no expectation of profit.
Significantly, the commission has left open the question of whether a
security is involved when a company uses retail trading stamps as a
method of financing its operations." 3
Howey and Silver Hills are therefore complementary decisions.
Where the expectation of profit is present, both reach the same result.
Where the investment return takes the form of a valuable but nonmate-
observed in Howey, 'it is immateral whether the enterprise is speculative or non-specu-
lative."' 389 U.S. at 345. The argument does not appear meritorious. The context of
the quote from Howey is: "If that test [the Howey test] be satisfied, it is immaterial
whether the enterprise is speculative or nonspeculative or whether there is a sale of
property with or without intrinsic value." 328 U.S. at 301.
Thus, the Court m Howey did not purport to eliminate inquiry into risk, but only
stated that it was unnecessary when the Howey test was satisfied. Likewise, in Tcher-
epnin, the Supreme Court did not cite its abbreviated quotation as a general proposition,
but used it in reaction to the court of appeal's argument that "the petitioners' with-
drawable capital shares are not within the purview of the 1934 Act because their value
normally does not fluctuate and because they normally are not traded m securities ex-
changes or over the counter." 389 U.S. at 345. Since the Court found the capital
shares to pass muster under Howey, such speculative inquiry was irrelevant.
A credible argument could be advanced that a distinction must be drawn between
speculation and risk capital. Whereas risk capital refers to the substantive reality of
a disguised venture capital offering, speculation is akin to gambling. The two terms
are not synonymous.
l11. Committee on Banking and Currency, F Rep. No. 47, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess.,
1 (1933).
112. See text accompanying note 82 supra.
113. SEC Securities Act Release No. 3890 (Jan. 21, 1958).
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nal benefit, the substance of the scheme determines if it violates an ex-
press public policy Where the purpose of promotion is the procurement
of venture capital with the risk of failure allocated substantially to the
public, the Silver Hills argument is appropriate. However, where
the scheme contains none of the characteristics of investment return,
as for example in the case of ordinary retail trading stamps, neither
case law nor policy considerations will sustain a securities theory 114
Such is the theory; in practice, how does one make such distinctions?
Some writers 15 question whether it is judicially practicable to
make these distinctions, and whether such distinctions are compatible
with federal law Justice Traynor would have the court focus on the
substance of the scheme, almost from a materiality standpoint. If the
type of risk and the degree to which it it allocated to the investor are
such that "those who risk their capital" are not afforded "at least a fair
chance of realizing their objective,""' 6 disclosure of these facts is war-
ranted. Reasonable men may differ as to whether this inquiry is too
indefinite for judicial discernment. Howey has the apparent benefit of
certainty and defimteness, but the problem is that the real world is
not as simple as the Howey formula or any other formula. Therefore,
the courts have been forced to resort to devices nearly as clever as those
of the entrepreneurs in order to fit the schemes within the "test." It
is likely that greater predictability will result as courts increasingly turn
to a risk analysis. It is true that ultimately risk analysis will be a mat-
114. Federal recognition of this interrelationship between risk capital and the
profit element of Howey is evident in the recent case of Forman v. Community Services
Inc., [Current Binder] CCH FE). SEc. L. REP. V 94,139, at 94,586 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6,
1973). Judge Pierce faced the very difficult issue of whether a share of a state
financed and supervised nonprofit cooperative housing corporation is a security within
the meaning of the federal securities laws. Since the restrictions on the shares pro-
hibited gain or loss on the disposition of the shares and barred the payment of divi-
dends, it was difficult to find the requisite profit motive. The plaintiffs argued that
the definition of profit should be expanded to include savings of money that might
otherwise have gone for more expensive housing. The court, however, chose to con-
strue this hedge against rising real estate costs not as a profit, but as an economic
benefit, thereby, failing the Hovey test. The court was cognizant of the argument
that monetary return is not essential in a risk capital case. However, the court found
this argument unavailing since the project was financed by New York State, and
thereby the resultant capital risk was zero.
Without reference to the result of the case, that the shares m the cooperative asso-
ciation were not securities, Forman might be considered authority for the proposition
that where there is little risk to the investor the courts will consider the elements of
Howey in a more restrictive fashion.
115. E.g., Note, Franchise Regulation under the California Corporate Securities
Law, 5 SAN DiEcO L. REV 140, 151 (1968).
116. 55 Cal. 2d at 815, 361 P.2d at 908, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
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ter of subjective judgment. In reaching that judgment, however,
courts may rely on certain objective criteria. Factors such as capitali-
zation, experience, sophistication, and proven track records are all
very helpful in determining whether the investor needs protection.117
In other areas of federal law, counsel and the courts have successfully
undertaken such a task. For example, in the antitrust field, the courts
have developed an extensive body of law delineating what is an "un-
reasonable restraint of trade."118  In advising clients on proposed pro-
motions, counsel would be well advised to treat the matter as if there
were a rebuttable presumption that the promotion involved a security,
and that the burden is on the promoter to prove that his promotion
falls within the fair risk variety. 9
7. Who is in control of the venture?
The securities acts were designed to protect those who are not in
a position to protect their investments. People who put their money
in other people's hands are usually powerless to control what is done
with the money. Under these circumstances it is appropriate for the
promoter to disclose the risks of the enterprise, so that the investor can
make an informed judgment. However, if the investor has the right
to determine how his capital is to be utilized, the policy underlying stat-
utory protection disappears. The emphasis, however, must be on
the quality of the investor's participation. As was seen in Glenn Tur-
ner,'20 using the term "solely"' 2 ' in the literal sense merely emasculates
the purposes of securities regulation. An unscrupulous promoter may
seek to evade the law by designing a scheme which utilizes some physi-
cal activity on the part of the investor. No longer is there sole re-
liance on the efforts of others, but neither is the investor any less de-
pendent upon the promoter.122
117. This land of analysis has been suggested with respect to franchises. See
Note, Franchise Regulation under the Califorma Corporate Securities Law, 5 SAx Di(Eo
L. Rnv. 140, 170 (1968). It should also be noted that these kinds of considerations
are also utilized m construing the pnvate offering exemption of the 1933 Act. The
analogy is not complete. The degrees of risk analysis is far broader m scope than
the private offering exemption.
118. See, e.g., Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
119. See text accompanying notes 99 supra.
120. 474 F.2d 476 (1973).
121. The phrase "solely from the efforts of others" really contains two problematic
terms: solely and efforts. In Glenn Turner, the court holds that solely should not
be used m the strict arithmetic sense and that efforts should be distinguished on the
basis of being discretionary or ministenal. Since the test for both terms is a qualitative
one, the two terms will be considered m concert.
122. There is a somewhat analogous body of jurisprudence which has developed
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There is considerable support for the view that "solely" did not
spring from prior judicial precedent. None of the state cases cited in
Justice Murphy's opinion even use the word. Indeed, State v Gopher
Tire & Rubber Co.,"' apparently the principal source of Murphy's defi-
ition, placed no such limitation on investment contracts. An invest-
ment contract was there held to mean a contract or scheme for "placing
of capital or laying out of money in a way intended to secure income or
profits from its employment."' 24
In a subsequent decision, the Supreme Court of Minnesota, re-
lying on Gopher Tire, affirmed a crininal conviction for selling in-
vestment contracts m a franchise-like situation. The vendee had ad-
vanced $1,000 as part payment for a motor bus which he agreed to
operate for guaranteed ratable wages; he was to have a share of the
profits and, eventually, stock in the busline organization. The court
noted:
The operator was helping finance the organization. He was not
merely a money lender. He was not working merely for wages.
He was not a copartner. He was to participate in profits as the
result of his investment, and eventually they were to be evidenced
by corporate stock. He invested with a view of making profits,
and the "operator's agreement" was the contract. It was quite as
much an investment contract as those involved in State v Gopher
Tire & Rubber Co 125
As for the prior federal cases cited by Justice Murphy, they "show
an inadvertent and unplanned acceptance of the 'profit through the ef-
forts of others' test as a condition for an investment contract."12 Even
subsequent to Howey, there has been no strict uniformity of interpre-
tation of this term.121 It is noteworthy that Justice Murphy indicated
his appreciation of the importance of managerial control.
concerning the participation of limited partners in limited partnerships. However, it
would be shortsighted to suggest that the same standards apply in considenng the type
of control which will remove the transaction from the protection of the securities laws.
123. 146 Minn. 52, 177 N.W 937 (1920).
124. Id. at 56, 177 N.W at 938.
125. State v. Bushard, 164 Minn. 455, 457, 205 N.W 370, 370-71 (1925).
126. Long, supra note 4, at 158.
127 An excellent example is Blackwell v. Bentsen, 203 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1953),
wherein the court, faced with a Howey type situation, thought it irrelevant that the
investors gave binding marketing instructions with respect to the produce harvested
from their particular tract of land. In SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. [Current
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP 93,960, at 93,844 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 19, 1973) the dis-
tnct court concluded that Glenn Turner-type pyramid scheme (indeed, Koscot was
owned by Turner) contained too much investor participation.
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A common enterprise managed by respondents or third parties
with adequate personnel and equipment is therefore essential if
the investors are to achieve their paramount aim of return on
their investments.
Thus all the elements of a profit-seeking business venture are pres-
ent here. The investors provide the capital and share m the earn-
ings and profits; the promoters manage, control and operate the
enterprise.'
2 8
Judge Duniway's analogy between Glenn Turner and Howey is
particularly apposite.
The essential nature of the scheme, however, would be the same.
He would still be buying, in exchange for money, trees and plant-
mg, a share in what he hoped would be the company's success m
cultivating the trees and harvesting and marketing the crop ..
Regardless of the fact that the purchaser here must contribute
something besides his money, the essential managerial efforts
which affect the failure or success of the enterprise are those of
Dare, not his own.'
2 9
It is thus apparent that the term "solely" creates a nightmare if
literally construed. Furthermore, such a construction conflicts with the
policy basis of the Howey decision. The Ninth Circuit, coming to
grips with these dilemmas, determined that no quantum of physical ef-
fort will render the investor any less impotent if he has no meaning-
ful decision making power over his money. Their decision represents
a rational approach, and their test of "essential managerial efforts"
should find a favorable reception.
With respect to investor control, Howey, as interpreted by the
Ninth Circuit in Glenn Turner, is analytically complementary to a risk
capital test. Both cases underscore the economic reality that the in-
vestor is entitled to disclosure if he relinquishes control of his capital
and is therefore dependent upon the promoter or a third party for reali-
zation of an investment return. The apparent difference between the
two tests is not in the analysis of control but rather in the factual set-
ting giving rise to the transaction. The Howey test is a general short-
hand for investment contracts, whereas in Silver Hills the risk capital
concept operated in the specific situation where the transaction amounted
to a disguised venture capital solicitation. The so-called "double in-
vestment"'8 0 analysis is a good illustration. This concept is founded
upon the proposition that one may examine a transaction in terms of
128. 328 U.S. at 300 (emphasis added).
129. 474 F.2d at 483.
130. See text accompanying notes 158-191 infra.
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separate business risks. For example, if an individual purchases a
franchise over which he is to exericse managerial control, it is difficult
for him to take the position that he is relying "solely on the efforts of
others.' 131  However, if his franchisor designs the sale of franchises
as a means of obtaining the venture capital to launch the enterprise,
it can be argued that there is a separate business risk apart from the
franchisee's risk of operating his business. 1 2
The analysis does not stop there. The solicitation of venture
capital must still be examined in terms of the quality of investor con-
trol. If, for example, the franchisee, in addition to operating his
franchise, occupied a decision making capacity with respect to the
sale of the franchises, say as a joint venturer with the franchisor, then
he would be in a position to protect his investment, and therefore,
the risk capital test would not be met.
The Oregon Supreme Court, in State ex rel. Healy v Consumer
Business System, Inc.,13 3 a pre-Glenn Turner decision, correctly utilized
the double investment approach in a risk capital setting to find a se-
curity under the Oregon statute,13 4 notwithstanding the fact that the
franchisee exercised managerial control over his franchise. The court
correctly held that "the Howey test was not exclusive"'135 and that a
prima facie case could be established under the risk capital theory if a
franchisor obtained a substantial portion of his initial capitalization by
selling franchises to the public. Perhaps because the investors were
passive with respect to the disguised venture capital offering, the
court stated generally-
[U]nder the Silver Hills theory, the courts are not concerned so
much with whether the investor derives his profit solely or sub-
stantially from the efforts of others, but rather with whether the
franchisor is depending on the investor for a substantial portion
of the intial capital needed to start the enterpnse.'
36
This statement is true with respect to the first aspect of the double
investment analysis (the disguised venture capital transaction), but it
would not be correct to conclude that an inquiry into control of the
capital raising venture is foreclosed.
The main point is that investment contracts as defined in Glenn
Turner and in the risk capital test are consistent. Qualitative analysis
131. See text accompanying notes 142-145 infra.
132. See text accompanying notes 159 infra.
133. 5 Ore. Ct. App. 19, 482 P.2d 549 (1971).
134. Oan. REv. STAT. § 59.005 et seq.
135. 5 Ore. Ct. App. at 29, 482 P.2d at 554.
136. Id. at 32, 482 P.2d at 555.
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of investor control is common to each. As the double investment con-
cept demonstrates, the inquiry as to which analysis to use is dependent
upon the economic realities of the particular facts of the case.
The Significance of the Answers
What significance do the answers to the above questions have?
First and foremost, they provide a means for determining the substance
of the transaction under analysis. The questions are not written on
tablets of stone and may prompt other questions which will likewise
be helpful. Second, they should provide the framework for comparing
a transaction with the emerging case law. With this second aspect in
mind, a review of current areas of developing interest is in order.
Analysis of Some Currently Litigated Areas
The following is a review of several major areas of litigation where
questions have arisen as to whether the promotions involve "securities,"
together with an analysis of these promotions in terms of the above
framework.
The Emerging Franchise Cases
It is likely that Justice Murphy never had the occasion to dine at
a McDonald's or to stay overnight at a Howard Johnson's or a similar
franchise when he authored his famous opinion. If he had, he would
have been amazed by the sheer magmtude of this postwar pehnomenon.
Indeed, the proliferation of the franchise concept is a perfect example
of changing economic realities. The idea really embraces the original
spirit of American capitalism. It enables an individual who is long on
ambition but short on money and experience to become an independ-
ent businessman by drawing upon the expertise and financial back-
ing of the corporate leadership. The other side of this coin is the
fact that bunko artists thrive in an environment where unsophisticated
people try to realize their economic dreams. The role of securities laws
in redressing such abuses is an open-ended topic of intense contem-
porary debate. This article is not a comprehensive study of this field;
that would be a treatise in itself. It is felt, however, that modern
day litigation in this area is putting the definitional concepts to per-
haps their toughest test.
Franchise cases to date have at least paid lip service to Howey
By their very nature, all franchises involve a common enterprise, since
the continuing success of each party to the enterprise is dependent
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upon the efforts and success of the others.137  Likewise, there is gener-
ally no problem in finding an investment of "money" with the "ex-
pectation of profit." Leaving the risk analysis aside for the moment,
the only difficulty in applying Howey to franchises is the requirement
that the profits be derived solely from the efforts of others. In the
world of franchising, the investor-franchisee can be found at every
point along the spectrum of "participation." This creates the insolvable
riddle of how inactive is "passive." Bernard Goodwin, a leading
expert in this field, tersely summarizes the umque features of this com-
mercial arrangement:
The business of franchusmg is basically an alternative to the ortho-
dox system of marketing and distribution. The franchisor ex-
changes a salable product or service, with management know-
how, for the outlet of the franchised small business distributor or
retailer, while retaining financial and operative control, plus some
important legal controls, of the common enterprise franchise sys-
tem. The franchisees share the nsks of establishing a new busi-
ness, but do not acquire either the ownership interest of stock-
holders or the security interest of bondholders, whereas the fran-
chisor does not dilute his ownership control or hazard losing con-
trol to a lender. 138
The terms of this relationship are made formal in the franchise
agreement. Typically, it provides that the franchisor will construct
and equip the outlet and tram the franchisee and designated third par-
ties in the art of successful operation of the enterprise. In return, the
franchisee covenants to pay a franchise fee for the exclusive right to
sell under the franchisor's name in a certain territory. He also prom-
ises to maintain certain uniform standards of quality, to protect the
franchisor's trademark and trade name, and, in many instances, to
purchase supplies exclusively from the franchisor or his designate. The
contract is enforced by periodic inspection. Violation of the terms of
the agreement is grounds for termination, in which event the franch-
sor pockets the fee and the franchisee incurs the debts. Whether a
court approaches this problem from a qualitative or quantitative stand-
point, the result is mere sophistry if it attempts to reconcile its finding
of a security with the word "solely" This is a clear example of a situa-
tion in which the traditional Howey formula, as construed by many
lower courts, suffers from arthritis. As might be expected, the rec-
137 See Comment, The Franchise as a Security: Application of the Securities
Laws to Owner-Operated Franchises, 11 B.C. IND. & COM. L. Rnv. 228, 234 (1970).
138. Goodwin, Franchising In the Economy: The Franchise Agreement as a
Security Under Securities Acts, Including lOb-5 Considerations, 24 Bus. LAw. 1311,
1312 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Goodwin].
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ord has been a patchwork of inconsistent decisions. The longevity of
the traditional rule is probably due in part to the dearth of franchise-
type cases dealing squarely with this issue. There have been some
cases, both before and after Howey (although not directly concerned
with franchises), which have rejected a restricted interpretation. 39 It
is fair to say, however, that for the most part, "solely" meant "solely"
in the minds of most federal court judges. Nevertheless, by the 1960's
the courts had begun to draw some basic guidelines.
In United States v. Herr,140 the Seventh Circuit affirmed a crim-
inal conviction for selling distributorship agreements that offered a
choice of an active or an inactive role. The court rejected the argu-
ment that this was simply a vendor-vendee relationship.
[lMt was not the intention of either the defendants or the investors
that the latter, themselves, were to actually resell the merchandise.
They were described as and were actually inactive. They were
led to believe that they could expect profits solely from the efforts
of others. 1
4'
This case, of course, fits neatly into the Howey formula, since
the court found complete passivity Where operations and control are
lodged entirely in the hands of a promoter or a third party, and the
investor merely contributes money, the courts have had little difficulty
finding an investment contract.
On the other hand, in Chapman v. Rudd Paint & Varnish Co.,'
42
the Ninth Circuit held that no security existed where the agreement
contemplated an active role and the franchisee admitted that he was
depending primarily upon his own efforts for the success or failure of
marketing the product. The hiatus formed by these two opinions is
considerably more problematic. In many cases, the promoter directs
his advertising to unsophisticated people having little money and no
experience in the management or operation of the enterprise. Conse-
quently, from the outset, they are almost entirely dependent upon the
franchisor. These prospective franchisees expect to contribute no
more than their money and routine labor. They rely completely on
the franchisor for management decision making and other assistance
139. For cases decided prior to Howey, see State v. Bushard, 164 Minn. 455, 205
N.W. 370 (1925); Stevens v. Liberty Packing Corp., Ill N.J. Eq. 61, 161 A. 193
(1932); subsequent to Howey, see Blackwell v. Bentsen, 203 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1953),
discussed supra note 127. See also SEC v. Addison, 194 F Supp. 709 (N.D. Tex.
1961) (contribution of some effort to the enterprise).
140. 338 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1964), discussed in Comment, Franchise Sales: Are
They Sales of Securities?, 34 ALBANY L. Rlv. 383, 387-88 (1970).
141. 338 F.2d at 610.
142. 409 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1969).
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in turning the business into a success. Once under way, the fran-
chisee is tightly circumscribed by strict enforcement of "quality con-
trol." Indeed, any maverick ambitions are suppressed by the prospect
of termination. Thus, the overt display of actual physical participa-
tion is really only a disguised ministerial straightjacket.
143
The franchisee has no more freedom to chart the course of his
business than a salaried manager in an establishment owned by
the franchisors. In fact, franchisors themselves feel that they
have more control over a franchisee than over a salaried manager.
Yet a manager of a single branch of a large chain owning stock
in that chain would be protected by the securities laws.
144
Certainly the law should protect the franchisee from the fraudu-
lent promoter. Whether the securities laws are the proper vehicle for
this purpose is open to legitimate question,145 but it is submitted that
in those instances where the economic reality is such that the substan-
tive control of the venture viewed as a whole is in the hands of the
promoter, the securities laws are designed to provide a remedy to the
franchise purchaser.
Multilevel Distributorships
The breakthrough appears to have come in the aftermath of
Silver Hills with a series of state and federal decisions dealing with
the most flagrantly fraudulent of all franchising practices-the sale of
multilevel distributorships. These schemes are typically of two types:
founder-membership programs and pyramid sales plans.1
46
The founder-membership plan involves soliciting capital (typi-
cally for an overpriced product) from a finite number of "founders."
The funds are to be used to construct a retail store. In return, the
"founder" receives identification cards which he distributes to prospec-
tive customers. When the store opens, the founders receive commis-
143. The plight of the small franchisee is described generally in Comment, The
Franchise As a Security: Application of the Securities Laws to Owner-Operated Fran-
chises, 11 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 228 (1970).
144. Id. at 237, accord, Goodwm, supra note 138. It may be surprising to some
that in Mr. Softee, Inc. v. Oil Workers Union, 162 N.L.R.B. 354 (1966), a franchisee
qualified as an "employee" under the terms of the National Labor Relations Act by
virtue of the constraints placed upon him by his franchisor. But see Coleman, A Fran-
chse Agreement: Not a "Security" Under the Securities Act of 1933, 22 Bus. LAW
493 (1967).
145. See Cobb v. Network Cinema Corp., 339 F Supp. 95, 98 n.1 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
146. For a general description in consideration of both these schemes, see SEC
Securities Act Release No. 5211 (Nov. 30, 1971), Applicability of the Securities Laws
to Multi-Level Distributorshps and Pyramid Sales Plans, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder]
CCH FFD. SEC. L, RaP. 78,446 at 80,973.
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sions on sales made to those persons with the identification cards.
Usually, by recruiting additional founder-members, the founder earns
an additional finder's fee and an override commission if his recruit
should subsequently enlist a new distributor. A variation of this
scheme is to sell consumer goods to the buyer at more than fair market
value, in return for which the buyer is entitled to commissions on a
referral arrangement.
The pyramid schemes, described above in the discussion of Glenn
Turner,147 involve a company which purports to market a line of prod-
ucts but in reality leads the prospective participants to believe that
they will profit by recruitment of other participants. These investors
do not expect to assume any of the significant functional responsibilities
which normally attend the operation of a franchise. The pyramid
schemes are doomed to failure because the scheme is based upon the
erroneous assumption that growth can be infinite. These schemes
emphasize the riches which await the successful recruiter, while ob-
scuring the fundamental relationsip created between the partici-
pants and the offeror. The issue is whether these schemes embody
sufficient investor participation, in terms of distribution of cards or
recruitment of distributors, to vitiate an investment contract theory.
A number of cases applied the rigid formula and found no in-
vestment contract.' 48  While some of these courts pointed out that the
buyer was not participating in the "profits" of the selling corpora-
tion,149 the striking parallelism of these cases was in their unanimous
vindication of the "solely" rationale. Typical is the language of a Texas
court:
It does not appear that Owens was to play the passive role of an
investor only. Management was in the hands of the company
but profits were not to be realized by Owens without his actual
and continued participation. The role was not "minimal" or a
147. See text accompanying notes 64-72 supra.
148. Until the advent of Glenn Turner, the following state cases formed the water-
shed of strict construction of nonmanagerial investor participation: Gallion v. Alabama
Mkt. Centers, Inc., 282 Ala. 679, 213 So. 2d 841 (1968); Georgia Mkt. Center, Inc.
v. Fortson, 225 Ga. 854, 171 S.E.2d 620 (1969); Fidelity Credit Co. v. Bradford, 177
So. 2d 635 (La. CL App. 1965); Emery v. So-Soft of Ohio, Inc., 94 Ohio L. Abs. 357,
199 N.E.2d 120 (Ct. App. 1964); Commonwealth ex rel. Pennsylvama Sec. Comm'n v.
Consumers Research Consultants, Inc., 414 Pa. 253, 199 A.2d 428 (1964); Bruner v.
State, 463 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Cnm. App. 1970); Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., v. King,
452 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
149. E.g., Commonwealth ex Tel. Pennsylvania Sec. Comm'n v. Consumers Research
Consultants, Inc., 414 Pa. 253, 256, 199 A.2d 428, 429 (1964). But see State ex
rel. Comm'r of See. v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 651, 485 P.2d 105,
110 (1971).
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mere walk-on, but one that occupied the center stage for most
of the play The expectation of financial return to the complain-
ing witness might have been raised by hopes falsely induced,
but since the "agreement" contemplates his active and actual par-
ticipation, we cannot conclude, viewing the transaction as a whole,
that it constitutes an "investment contract" within the meaning of
the Texas Securities Act.150
Other courts, however, have found these schemes too repugnant
to warrant such benign tolerance. In sweeping fashion, the Supreme
Court of Hawaii held that a founder-membership plan constituted a
security-
[I]t is irrelevant to the remedial purposes of the Securities Act
that an investor participates in a minor way in the operations of
the enterprise. The courts should focus on the quality of the par-
ticipation. In order to negate the finding of a security the offeree
should have practical and actual control over the managerial de-
cisions of the enterprise. For it is this control which gives the
offeree the opportunity to safeguard his own investment, thus ob-
viating the need for state intervention.' 51
This crack in the franchise facade allows a new concept to slip
through; within "solely" lies a distinction between mere active partici-
pation and meaningful managerial control over one's investment. This
distinction was seized upon by the district court in SEC v Glenn W
150. Bruner v. State, 463 S.W.2d 205, 215 (Tex. 1970).
151. State ex rel. Comm'r of Sec. v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 651-
52, 485 P.2d 105, 111 (1971). This is possibly the most progressive case in the na-
tion with respect to the definition of a security. Indeed, it adopts the revised test of
Professor Coffey-
"A 'security' is: (1) A transaction in which (2) a person ('buyer') furnishes value
('initial value') to another ('seller'); and (3) a portion of initial value is subjected
to the risks of an enterprise, it being sufficient if-
(a) part of initial value is furnished for a proprietary interest in, or debt-holder
claim against, the enterprise, or
(b) any property received by the buyer is committed to use by the enterprise, even
though the buyer retains specific ownership of such property, or
(c) part of initial value is furnished for property whose present value is deter-
mined by taking into account the anticipated but unrealized success of the enter-
prise, even though the buyer has no legal relationship with the enterprise; and
(4) at the time of the transaction, the buyer is not familiar with the operations of
the enterprise or does not receive the right to participate in the management of the
enterprise; and (5) the furnishing of initial value is induced by the seller's promises
or representations which give rise to a reasonable understanding that a valuable benefit
of some kind, over and above initial value, will accrue to the buyer as a result of the
operation of the enterprise." Coffey, supra note 4, at 377
Hawaii Market Centers represents one of the finest examples of a court boldly
coning to grips with modern economic reality. However, it is submitted that as
thoughtful as Professor Coffey's formula is, it suffers the same flaw as the Howey form-
ula. Clever entrepreneurs will wind a path around the black letter and force courts
back to analysis rather than mechanics.
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Turner Enterprises, Inc.152 Once the court found as a matter of fact
that the investor's efforts were ministerial, and not discretionary, the
result followed quite easily. The Ninth Circuit, bound by this finding
of fact, affirmed the decision on the ground that the investor lacked
essential managerial control to affect the success or failure of the en-
terprise.1
53
Glenn Turner has not achieved universal acceptance, however.
Recently, Judge Smith of the Northern District of Georgia, concluded
that no security existed under almost precisely the same facts as in
Glenn Turner.r'; The judge noted that there may be room to discount
de minimus efforts on the part of the investor: "But, even so, this
court sees the distributor's efforts in the Koscot program as funda-
mental and substantial, not token. Accordingly, broad reading will
not help the Commission in this respect."
155
Taking cognizance of the Ninth Circuit's opinion, Judge Smith
stated that:
[The Court of Appeals for this Circuit, as well as the Supreme
Court, has repeatedly stated the "solely" test as the standard for
an investment contract. This district court sees no freedom to coin
a new, different and more expansive standard in light of these
binding higher court decisions.
156
Judge Smith's opinion highlights a difference which the Supreme
Court may ultimately resolve. The federal courts may be embroiled
in what amounts to a quibble. The Ninth Circuit will continue to
make nice distinctions between participation which is "ministerial"
and that which is "discretionary." Concurrently, the Fifth Circuit may
continue to label analogous efforts "fundamental and substantial." The
152. 348 F Supp. 766 (D. Ore. 1972).
153. 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973).
154. SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
93,960, at 93,844 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 19, 1973). Representing that the facts were similar
is somewhat of an understatement. Both Glenn Turner Enterprises and Koscot Inter-
planetary were pyramid sales schemes owned and operated in an almost identical man-
ner by Glenn Turner.
It should be noted also that Judge Smith is no stranger to this issue. See Cobb
v. Network Cinema Corp., 339 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
155. [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1 93,960, at 93,846.
156. Id. Judge Smith goes on to say that "Eniot every get-rich-quick scheme is
a 'security' within the meaning of federal law, and neither the number or the nature
of the participants nor possible fraud will transmit the sale of an opportunity to partici-
pate actively in a distributorship recruiting program into a 'security' if, in its legal and
economic effects, the thing sold is not a 'security."' Id. at p. 93,845.
Utilizing risk analysis, it may well be that most get-nch-quick schemes embrace
an element of unreasonable risk allocation on the investor and thereby constitute a
prima facie argument that the economic reality of the scheme is a security.
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franchise arrangements encompass a variety of participatory levels.
Trying to draw lines between minimsterial and discretionary participa-
tion may well prove as difficult as determining the meaning of the word
"solely" For example, a reasonable argument could be made that a
McDonald's franchise is an investment contract. McDonald's is so
successful that all investors owe unquestioned allegiance to the fran-
chsor. The operators and workers are trained at McDonald's schools,
and the site is prearranged. In effect, the argument would be that
these hamburger stands are nothing more than cages of trained mon-
keys.1"7  One might ask, is there any meamngful distinction between
the Glenn Turner distributors and the franchisee who operates the
"Golden Arches?" Certainly they project different appearances. One
man is out hustling his fellow man and the other is a "productive citi-
zen" housed in a commercial structure, selling legitimate goods, and
paying wages and taxes.
After first blush, the distinction begins to fade. Both rely almost
entirely upon the promotional efforts of their franchisor. Neither con-
templates a decision-making role with respect to his investment dol-
lars. Their profit making activity consists mainly of physical labor and
following the rules. Viewed in this light, both roles seem equally min-
isterial. The distinction, if any, is that one is engaged in more socially
desirable acitvity than the other.
The foregoing abstraction is not meant to imply that all McDonald's
franchises are or are not securities; it is merely to indicate that the ob-
vious differences may find judicial recogition. More importantly, this
is in no way directed at upsetting the legal wisdom of the Ninth Cir-
157 This is certainly the thrust of Goodwin's article. "With this in mind, the
Courts, especially the United States Supreme Court, when properly presented with the
problem, can logically say that a franchisee could not exist without the success of the
entire common enterprise franchise system, which is operated and controlled solely
by the franchisor, and, furthermore, that the franchisee's profits depend thereon. The
Courts, in dissecting the modus operandi of the standard franchise system, will readily
appreciate that the real functions of the franchisee comprise mostly ministerial rather
than discretionary activities, when considered in relation to the franchise system as a
whole, virtually making franchisees employee managers cloaked with the dignity of
ownership." Goodwin, supra note 138, at 1319 Franchise industry spokesmen, how-
ever, disagree: "The franchisee's success depends almost entirely upon his desire to
do a job adhering to the policies, the regulations, and the systems of the parent com-
pany; and his benefits are tied to his own ability to do this job which was prespecified
and which he accepted as his responsibility. This is completely opposite from the
theory of purchasing securities. An individual purchasing a security of a corporation
depends upon the management of the corporation for his return on his investment. He
has nothing to say about the policies, the type of business, or the direction of this
corporation m which he has invested. " Thomas J. Murphy, The Publisher Speaks,
CONTINENTAL FRANCHISE REVIEw, April 6, 1970.
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cuit. The purpose is simply to illustrate how hamstrung the federal
courts have become in trying to engraft the Howey criteria onto every
modem financing concept. The judicial infatuation with the word
"solely" is only the most obvious indication of the problem.
A second issue raised by franchising is the application of risk and
risk capital analysis. This problem is encountered when the franchisor
attempts to finance his operation from the fee of the franchisee. If
the franchisee is to play a passive or ministerial role, there is no diffi-
culty in satisfying the Howey rationale as modernized by Glenn Turner.
On the other hand, if the franchisee has discretionary functions,
the nature of the risk to the public may be sufficient to permit separation
of the active management of the franchise from the initial funding of
the franchisor's operation. With respect to the latter the investor is to-
tally passive, thereby falling squarely within the purview of Howey
Apparently, the California Attorney General first introduced this
"double investment" concept.1 8
The risk capital . . . is provided by the franchisee to the fran-
chisor to enable the franchisor to supply the franchisee with cer-
tain goods and services. This latter aspect seems to us to be a
separate business risk apart from the success or failure of the
franchisee's conduct of the franchised business . . . . Following
this reasoning, it would seem that the franchised business oper-
ated by the franchisee and the franchisor's business of supplying
the franchisee with goods and services are separate "business ven-
tures" and that the venture in wich the franchisee participates
is not the same venture for which he supplies the risk capital.
The fact that these two "business ventures" are contained in the
same franchise agreement should not obscure this distinction.' 59
The double investment analysis has been attacked as a legal fic-
tion. The crux of the argument is that the franchise agreement is an
integrated whole, not two separate ventures. For example, one writer
asks,
Why should the franchisee be concerned with what the franchisor
intends to do with the money received from the sale of the fran-
chise? Naturally, the franchisee would be interested in the ability
of the franchisor to continue to provide the necessary goods and
services, but this is one of the normal risks of the franchised
business, not a separate risk as suggested by the Attorney Gen-
eral.100
Further, critics assault the assumption that the speculative nature
158. 49 OP. CAL. ATr'VY GEN. 124 (1967).
159. Id. at 129.
160. Note, Franchise Regulation Under the California Corporate Securities-Law, 5
SAN DmGo L. REv. 140, 161 (1968).
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of an enterprise is subject to objective determination. 6' This argu-
ment stems from the attorney general's statement that "[J]t is not clear
what degrees of under-capitalization by the franchisor will cause the fees
paid by the franchisee to be characterized as 'risk capitar within the
Silver Hills rule." '62  The attorney general goes on to allude to a
"degree of risk" analysis suggested by one writer.
A venture in its promotional stages, financed on a shoestring, as
in Silver Hills, would seem to fit easily into a high degree of risk
to the investor category. On the other hand, an established coun-
try club or other organzation having a sound financial standing
would seem clearly to fall outside the "degree of risk" rule.'
63
Many feel that distinguishing between high and low risk is simply
too subjective an exercise for the courts. Finally, one commentator
wonders why the theaory is limited to initial capitalization.
If the purpose of the Corporate Securities Law is to protect the
investing public against spurious schemes, why does the Attorney
General not define risk capital to include schemes to raise capital
for an existing but unproven business, as well as schemes to raise
initial capital? 164
These are valid comments. It is very difficult to answer these
questions by using the cumbersome language of Howey, or by simply
uttering the term "risk capital." By utilizing the principles discussed
in this article, however, these arguments may be answered in an orderly
manner, and, in addition, the economic realities of which Justice Mur-
phy spoke in Howey may be exposed. The first criticism is the al-
leged fictitious distinction between two separate business risks within
one franchise agreement. Why should the franchisee care what happens
to his money, so long as he receives the desired goods and services?
Here, the error is one of perspective. In testing investment contracts,
the examiner must stand principally in the shoes of the promoter. The
franchisor did not design his scheme as a single contract for business
services; he sought financing. "The franchisor has done a brilliant
thing. Though he has neither given up equity nor incurred any debt
in his franchising business, he still raises capital to launch the busi-
ness."
165
This is not a fictitious distinction. There is a great difference
161. 50 CALiF L. REv. 156, 160 (1962).
162. 49 Op. CAL. ATr'y GEN. 124, 129 (1967).
163. Id. citing 50 CALrn L. Ruv. 156, 160 (1962).
164. Note, Franchise Regulation Under the California Corporate Securities Law, 5
SAN DiEGo L. REv. 140, 164 (1968).
165. Goodwin, The Franchise As a Security and 10b-5 Considerations, in THE
FRANCIRmSNG SouRcEBooK, 247, 253 (McCord ed. 1970).
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between paying a franchise fee to Conrad Hilton for the right to operate
a hotel and turning over the money to a fly-by-night promoter with
a great story. The investor always assumes the risk of future delivery,
but in the latter case he does not expect to be directly responsible for
starting the franchisor's enterprise. Several states' 16 have recognized
this difference and accordingly have protected the investor in an initial
capitalization.1
6 7
Finally, some writers argue that the California Attorney General
has unreasonably restricted the double investment concept to start-up
operations as opposed to established enterprises. This is a valid point.
It is difficult to discern any reason why all disguised forms of public
financing should not fall within the purview of the risk capital anal-
ysis. It is true that the start-ups are the easiest to spot, and at first
blush it may seem to make more sense to protect the public from a
scheme which has just been planned rather than from an enterprise
which has a long track record. When an existing business launches
a new venture, however, the opportunity for abuse is equally pro-
nounced. In these situations, courts are probably on firm ground in
utilizing a risk analysis or risk capital theory.
Much of the analytical difficulty could be alleviated by recogniz-
ing that the policy requiring disclosure of risk in schemes designed to
secure financing is an independent basis for invoking the aegis of
the securities laws. With respect to public offerings, merely subjecting
the public to unreasonable risk may be sufficient basis for finding a se-
curity. Acknowledgement of this argument would preclude much of
the gamesmanship required to fit risk capital into the test of Howey.'68
In recent years some courts have candidly discussed the theories
involved in ascertaining what constitutes a security. One of the more
thorough analyses was given in a case which found that the scheme did
not involve a security. Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc.6 9 is
cited by some for the proposition that no security is involved when the
franchisee operates and controls his own business. However, the case
is much more subtle. Without regard to the correctness of the specific
result, the court's analysis is helpful. The court noted: "[W]ho exercised
actual control over the restaurant is not determinative. Rather, it is
merely a factor to consider."'7 °
166. See id. at 253.
167. The additional argument that too much certainty is sacrificed by such analy-
sis is discussed in text accompanying notes 115-118 supra.
168. See text accompanying notes 104-118 supra.
169. 324 F Supp. 640 (D. Colo. 1970).
170. 324 F. Supp. at 644.
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The court then proceeded to focus upon the quality of the investor
participation. The opinion did not mechanically propose that every
franchisee who operates his own business is precluded from raising an
investment contract or other securities argument. Quite to the con-
trary, the court focused upon economic reality and found that where
a franchisee did not own and operate his own business he still may not
have purchased an investment contract. This type of analysis of the
catch phrase "solely from the efforts of others" was discussed with
approval by the district court in Glenn Turner 171 "The court [in
Mr Steak weighted] the relative participation in the control of the fran-
chised restaurant before determining that the substantial degree of au-
thority held by the franchisee was inconsistent with a securities transac-
tion."1
72
The facts in Mr Steak involved the sale of a "turn-key" distribu-
torship to a sophisticated franchisee. The agreement called for un-
limited financial participation by an experienced franchisee who was
well acquainted with the nature of the enterprise. In this setting, the
typical franchlsor-franchisee relationship was reversed. Even though
the franchisee delegated control of the restaurant to the franchisor,
the court presumably found that the decision to delegate by the fran-
chisee was a discretionary function contemplated by the franchise
agreement which vested the power of managerial control in the fran-
chisee.
[T]he role of the franchisee was envisioned as a flexible one,
depending upon the business expertise and inclination of the
franchisee That River City Steak delegated performance
of those duties and ignored daily operations does not affect the
nature of its powers, nor change the essential fact that River City
Steak abandoned what rights of control and participation it did
have.17
3
It is difficult to tell from the opinion whether Judge Arraj was
analyzing the problem from the standpoint of the franchisor or the
franchisee. While the result may be the same, the method is important.
There is a vast difference between denying the existence of an invest-
ment contract on the ground that the franchisor sold to informed pur-
chasers whom he knew would be in a position to decide how to manage
the day-to-day chores, and finding no security because the agreement
171. SEC v. Glenn W Turner Enterprises, Inc., 348 F Supp. 766 (D. Ore. 1972).
172. Id. at 775; accord, Romney v. Richard Prows, Inc., 289 F Supp. 313 (D.
Utah 1968).
173. Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 324 F Supp. 640, 645 (D. Colo.
1970).
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was signed by sophisticated people who theoretically do not need the
protection of the act. The former goes to the ability to control the in-
vestment; the latter involves the element of reliance. The distinction is
highlighted by section 17(a) of the 1933 Act which prohibits fraud in
the offer as well as the sale of securities. If courts were to consider the
subsequent activities of the purchaser in defining the term security for
the purposes of a sale, a needless dichotomy might be created since those
activities would hardly be considered with reference -to an offer of sale.
Under the classic Howey analysis, the courts job is now over.
Having studied the efforts of the franchisee, and having found them to
be meaningful, most courts would foreclose the possibility of an in-
vestment contract. To Judge Arraj's credit, not only did he undertake
a liberal analysis of the efforts of the franchisee, but in addition he
undertook the first clear attempt in a federal court to apply a risk cap-
ital analysis.
One salient feature of most cases finding an investment contract
has involved the solicitation of funds for speculative, poorly-fi-
nanced business ventures174 .. .or emergent industries. 175 In
these instances the investor, even if he can participate in or control
some phase of the enterprise, is gambling "risk capital," where
there is less than an even chance of success, against the oppor-
tunity for large profits. Because of the substantial risk of loss, to
include such operations within the purview of the 1933 Act would
fulfill the purpose of protecting passive investors by compelling
disclosure of the disquieting aspects of a scheme. Under this ap-
proach, once the requisite risk is shown there would be no com-
pelling reason to exclude a franchise operation from the Act's
coverage.176
The judge is thus expressing the long standing policy of extending
the protection of the securities acts to venture capital situations. This
interpretation draws support from the court's subsequent discussion of
Silver Hills. The court cautiously read this case as applying strictly to
initial capitalization. "The court inplies by this holding [in Silver Hills]
that where an ongoing business is involved, there is no imperative need
for the protections of security acts, and those businesses should not be
included.'
77
174. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943); Roe v. United States,
287 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1961); SEC v. Bailey, 41 F Supp. 647 (S.D. Fla. 1941); and
SEC v. Universal Serv. Ass'n, 106 F.2d 232 (7th Cir. 1939).
175. Continental Marketing Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1967); SEC v.
Payne, 35 F Supp. 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
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Accordingly, this court would consider the Califorma attorney
general's double investment concept too extreme. Judge Arraj would
limit the theory to situations " where exceptionally high risk,
speculative franchises are involved In other situations, we con-
sider the risk undertaken by the franchisee as incident to the conduct of
his business.'
' 7 8
The court completed its discussion by analyzing the risk of the
venture in question and concluded:
River City Steak, Inc.'s investment in plaintiff's business com-
prised the purchase of the Mr. Steak name and method of doing
business. Any "risk" to River City Steak created by that pur-
chase is an msubstantial and legitimate risk of doing business. That
risk does not warrant investor protection, and so under our analy-
sis, no security interest subject to registration and regulation un-
der the 1933 Act has been created. 179
Except for the emphasis upon the activities carried out by the fran-
chisee, this methodology is consistent with the type of analysis sug-
gested in this article. First, the court took a close look at what role
the franchisor contemplated the franchisee playing. Looking through
form to substance, the court found it to be substantial and discretion-
ary despite the facade of absentee delegation. Next, it turned to a risk
capital analysis to see whether the scheme was disguised as a public
offering, and thus whether the policy of the securities acts should be in-
yoked. The case is particularly valuable in that it demonstrates the
use of a reasoned analysis, as opposed to the simple application of a
mechanical test. 80
When using general terms such as "efforts of others," "control,"
"risk," etc., it is far too easy to begin equating tung trees and chin-
chillas with Howard Johnsons.' s ' Franchising is unique because the
178. Id. at 647
179. Id.
180. As Judge Arraj put it: "While we consider the 'risk capital' analysis appro-
priate in some instances where franchises are involved, we also recognize the peculiar
nature of franchises is such that they cannot be as easily categorized or analyzed as
other security interests." Id.
181. "[S]chemes which have been held with almost monotonous consistency to
involve 'investment contracts' and similar 'securities' are based on a purported sale or
lease of some form of tangible property subject to an arrangement whereby the seller
retains possession and control of the property with a view to earning a profit for the
nominal owners or lessees. The catalog of these schemes is as variegated as the imagi-
nations of promoters. Many of them involve animals, preferably of either a fecund
or a fur-bearing variety. A person 'sells' pairs of silver foxes, for example, with the
idea that he will supply the expert care (for a charge, of course) and in due time
nature will supply lots of pups-one is tempted to say 'a true stock dividend.' Other
promoters' tastes have run to shares m fishing boats, automobile trailers, vending
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franchisor must insist on certain uniform standards to maintain his
national image and reputation. If he does not properly police his
franchisees, he runs the risk of losing his trademark and trade name
under the Lanham Act."8 2 This is an economic reality which must
be considered along with others, but which would not be determinative
by itself.
Wieboldt v. Metz' 88 is a more recent application of a similar anal-
ysis. Metz dealt with a typical franchise where the franchise agree-
ment contemplated active participation by the franchisee (who did in
fact control and operate the franchise). The issue was whether the
franchisee's active participation was negated by his dependency on his
franchisor. The court held that it was not, finding no investment con-
tract. Judge Lasker stated:
[IMt is only necessary that the franchisee exercise policy-making
power over his unit of the enterprise, since to require control over
the franchisor's entire system is incompatible with the franchising
method and would make all franchises investment contracts.'8 4
Analytically, the court approached the matter correctly First,
the court examined the transaction in light of the traditional Howey
rule. Finding no security under this rule (in fact the plaintiff con-
ceded this point) the court went on to consider a "liberalized and
broadened concept '185 of investment contract. Following the same
path as Mr. Steak, the court noted that pursuant to Silver Hills, an in-
vestment contract should be found if the agreement amounted to an
initial capitalization.
The theory behind the test is that, under those circumstances,
the profit-making potential of his investment is essentially realized
by the franchisor and the Howey test that "profits [are] to come
solely from the efforts of others" is satisfied.
186
This theory was perforated by the fact that this franchisor had
been in operation for ten years prior to the agreement.' 8 7  The state-
ment of facts also discloses that the situation did "not involve numer-
ous, scattered, ignorant investors""' since the defendant sold only
machines and parking meters, cemetery lots (which are sold in sufficient quantities to
provide for the buyers' interment unto the third and fourth generation), and such other
types of real estate as tung trees, vineyards, fig orchards, and farm land to be paid
for with crops raised by the vendor." 1 Loss, supra note 6, at 489-91.
182. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. (1970).
183. 355 F Supp. 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
184. Id. at 260.
185. Id. at 258.
186. Id. at 259.
187. Id. at 261.
188. Id. at 257.
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eight franchises of the type offered to plaintiffs. The argument could
be made that this arrangement hardly amounted in substance to a dis-
guised solicitation of venture capital. 189  In considering the applica-
tion of Glenn Turner to the Metz facts, the court agreed that an in-
vestment contract would be present if the franchisee did not have
"meamngful control" over his enterprise. 190
This review of Mr Steak and Metz is not intended as an endorse-
ment of the results in those cases, but rather as an approval of the
analytic methods employed by those courts. The decisions appear con-
servative in viewing most franchises not to be securities, a conservatism
which has not in the past been supported by the Supreme Court in its
review of investment contracts. The results may represent a viable
line of demarcation, but until the Congress or the Supreme Court en-
dorses the result, practitioners would do well to be extremely cau-
tious m this area. There also appears to be no compelling policy rea-
son why large, well-established franchises should not be subjected to
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws and/or be re-
quired to register their investment opportunities as securities.' 9 '
189. It is important not to confuse the private offering exemption from registra-
tion with the broader scope of the risk analysis in situations amounting to a disguised
venture capital offering.
190. Id. at 260.
191. Recent cases lend increasing support to methods and conclusions reached by
the courts in Glenn Turner, Hawaii Market Centers, and Metz. In Lino v. City Invest-
ing Co., [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP 94,124, at 94,505 (3rd Cir. Aug. 20,
1973), the Third Circuit stated, "The reasoning of the Supreme Court, the Ninth
Circuit, the SEC [Securities Act Release No. 5211 (Nov. 30, 1971)] and Supreme Court
of Hawaii leads us to hold that an investment contract can exist where the investor
is required to perform some duties, as long as they are nominal or limited and would
have 'little direct effect upon receipt by the participant of the benefits promised by
the promoters.'"
Although the Third Circuit found the above authorities persuasive, the court re-
versed the district court and held that no investment contract existed where the fran-
chisee controlled his franchise and was "required to make significant efforts." Id. at
94,505.
Similarly, in Nash & Associates, Inc. v. Lum's, Inc., [Current Binder] CCH FED.
SEC, L. REP 94,126, at 94,513 (6th Cir. Sept. 5, 1973), the Sixth Circuit stated,
"We find the general concept of a less restrictive approach attractive in view of the
broad remedial purposes of the federal legislation and the importance of flexibility as
stressed in Howey." Id. at 94,515.
After considering Glenn Turner, Silver Hills, Mr Steak, and Hawaii Market Cen-
ter, the court concluded along the same lines as the Metz decision. Since the fran-
chisor was adequately capitalized and the franchisee had invested in his own business
and was in control of his own business, the court held that the franchise agreement
had none of the traditional qualities of a security.
Importantly neither decision speaks in terms of "managerial efforts" as did the
Ninth Circuit, rather they held that "solely" should not be construed literally. It is
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Naked Commodity Options
A storm of controversy is currently brewing over a new type of
promotion recently conceived by ingenious promoters. These are the
naked commodities option cases.
The case of SEC v. Goldstein Samuelson, Inc. ("GSI") 192 is typ-
ical of a number of recent federal actions brought to restrain specula-
tive option trading in the commodities market. The basic operation
is quite simple. For a specified premium, the investor receives an op-
tion to buy or sell (or both) a specified commodities futures contract
from or to GSI during a specified period at a fixed price. The op-
tions are termed "naked" because GSI does not purchase the futures
contract to winch the customer's option relates. One attraction of these
options is that the investor's risk of loss is limited to the amount of the
premium. On the other hand, the amount of profit is based in
theory upon the investor's timing in exercising the option at a favorable
price in the face of a fluctuating commodities market. The contin-
gencies surrounding payment of the investor's claim, however, form
the gravamen of the lawsuit. GSI is not obligated to use the investor's
premium to purchase a futures contract to cover the risk created by
selling the option. Instead, the money is diverted to general corporate
purposes. Therefore, the GSrs risk of loss is based upon: (1) The
risk of price fluctuation in the underlying futures contract; (2) The
investor's ability to take advantage of favorable price movement; and
(3) most important, GSI's own success in generating sufficient ad-
ditional capital, through the employment of investor's premiums, to en-
able GSI to pay off incoming option claims. "GSI regards its obliga-
tions to its customers as essentially general unsecured obligations of the
firm and the customer takes the risk of GSI's continued ability to meet
its obligations."'19
also interesting to note that both claims arose from the alleged damage to the fran-
chisee stemming from the loss of the franchisor's support. The economic reality of
this interdependence between franchisee and franchisor should certainly provide the
basis for future litigation.
See also Mitzner v. Cardet Int'l, 358 F Supp. 1262 (N.D. 1ll. 1973) which dem-
onstrates increasing judicial acceptance of the analysis set forth in Mr. Steak, Glenn
Turner and Metz, and also offers a middle ground with respect to quasi-Glenn Turner
type franchises.
192. SEC v. Goldstein Samuelson, Inc., Civil No. 73-472-RJK (C.D. Cal., filed Apr.
2, 1973). For the purposes of this discussion, GSI will be considered together with
its companion case against GSI's subsidiary: SEC v. First Leisure Corp., Civil No. 72-
2616-1RK (C.D. Cal., filed Mar. 12, 1973).
193. Brief for Plaintiff at 10, SEC v. First Leisure Corp., Civil No. 72-2616-RJK
(C.D. Cal., filed Mar. 12, 1973), citing Receiver's Report at 4.
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In this case, the money making efforts of twenty-eight year-old
Harold Goldstein, chairman of GSI, were somewhat less than successful.
Although GSI had grown from nothing to a $25 million per month
business in less than two years, when bankruptcy was declared on
April 30, 1973, its liabilities, including profits owed to its custom-
ers, were estimated to be m the neighborhood of $76 million, compared
with unconfirmed assets of around $17 million."" Concurrently Mr.
Goldstein was indicted and pleaded guilty to three counts of mail
fraud in connection with the issuance of fraudulent financial state-
ments and a letter claiming that a surety bond, which was in fact non-
existant, underwrote the options. In March of 1973, when the above
facts began to surface, the SEC filed suit seeking a preliminary injunc-
tion and the appointment of a receiver. District Judge Kelleher had
before him a record of fraudulent activity which included the falsifi-
cation of financial records, the attempted diversion of assets out of
the Uited States, the concealment and destruction of corporate rec-
ords, and the concealment of the company's insolvent condition while
Goldstein continued to seek funds from public investors. Judge Kelle-
her refused to sustain the prelimnnary injunction and ordered the ac-
tion to proceed to trial on the merits. Contemporaneous with the SEC
action, California Corporations Commissioner Van Camp filed for sim-
lar relief under state law against Puts and Calls Inc., a firm with opera-
tions similar to GSI. The state court ruled that a preliminary injunction
was the proper remedy and appointed a receiver. One may wonder
why two courts faced with similar records of outrageous fraud came
to opposite conclusions. The answer is purely jurisdictional; the state
court found Puts and Calls Inc. to be selling securities, l9 5 while the
federal court thought the issue was too close to justify extraordinary
relief.
Historically, commodities futures contracts (agreements for the
delivery of a specified quantity of a commodity at any day in a given
future month) have been excluded from the definition of a security
The rationale is that the elements of common enterprise and reliance
on the efforts of others are absent.' 90 There is said to be no inter-
locking of common interests since the purchaser acquires "the power
to exercise absolute dominion and control over the specified commodi-
ties."'191 Likewise the facts of future delivery and speculative motives
194. Id., citing Receiver's Report at 5.
195. California v. Puts & Caus, Inc., (Super. Ct., filed Aug. 6, 1973).
196. See 1 Loss, supra note 6, at 491-92.
197 Sinva, Inc. v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 253 F Supp. 359,
366 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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do not constitute reliance upon the "continuing efforts of another."
"In the words of the Supreme Court [the investor has] been left to [his]
own devices for realizing upon [his] rights."198
Congress recognized the strong resemblance between futures con-
tracts and traditional securities. Both are traded on regular markets;
the investor can buy on margin and hold long or short positions, and
many of the transactions are placed through the same brokerage
houses. Accordingly, the Commodities Exchange Act'99 was promul-
gated. This act authorizes the Commodity Exchange Authority, op-
erating out of the Department of Agriculture, to regulate the various
commodities exchanges. Section 6(b)200 has been construed as ac-
cording to private investors an implied claim for relief for fraudulent
practices. The difficulty, however, is that section 2201 of this counter-
part to the securities acts regulates only a finite number of commodities.
There is no federal claim available to the investor in unregulated fu-
tures. 20 2 (GSrs options, of course, were strictly limited to unregulated
commodities.) It is clear, however, that certain arrangements involv-
ing commodities may come within the ambit of the securities acts.
For example, in Maheu v. Reynolds & Co., 203 the court had no diffi-
culty finding an investment contract where the investor placed his
money in a discretionary commodities account which was managed
and supervised solely by defendants. GSI was thus selling commodi-
ties which -the SEC conceded were not in and of themselves securities.
In GSI the defense argued that because the options take the char-
acter of the underlying instrument or interest, no securities are in-
volved. The SEC met this argument by analogizing the GSI scheme
to the familiar investment contract precedents dealing with silver foxes
and orange groves.204 They contended:
The purchase or sale of GSI options has no direct relationship to
commodities future contracts or actual commodities. Option pur-
chasers do not contemplate the acquisition of commodities or fu-
tures contracts. GSI has no obligation to any investor to buy (or
sell) commodities or commodities futures and may, if it chooses,
198. Id. at 367.
199. Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), formerly ch. 369, § 1, 42
Stat. 998 (1922). California has recently enacted legislation which regulates commodi-
ties transactions. See A.B. 799 (1973).
200. 7 U.S.C. § 6(b) (1970).
201. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
202. E.g., Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co., 265 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
203. 282 F. Supp. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); accord, Berman v. Orimex Trading, Inc.,
291 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
204. See note 181 supra.
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devote the funds received to any unrelated purpose as it sees fit.
Whether a payment can or will be made to investors is dependent
upon the success of GSI and the management of the pooled in-
vestors' funds which have been committed to it.
20 5
In short, the SEC argued that the investor's efforts and choices are
inconsequential unless GSI successfully generates profits on its own.
In this profit-generating enterprise, the interests of all GSI option hold-
ers are common with those of GSI. The defense replied that this con-
fuses factors which lead to the realization of profits by a GSI customer
with those factors which lead to payment of that profit. With respect
to the former, the investor is left to his own devices. With respect to
the latter, the defendants conceded that payment depends entirely
upon GSI's willingness and capability to respond to customer claims.
However, the defense argued that the ability to pay is not a securities
issue. Rather, insolvency is a fact of commercial life and every credi-
tor assumes this risk.
The GSI situation provides an obvious example of what may re-
sult from a mechaical application of the Howey test. Ostensibly, GSI
would seem to have a colorable argument. Upon closer scrutiny, the
alleged distinction between realization of profit and payment is pat-
ently fallacious. By examining how effective the investor's efforts were
allowed to be with reference to the promotional scheme, it is obvious
that GSI was designed in such a way that any "profit generation" on
the part of the investor was illusory It is true that the investors were
led to believe that they must exercise discretionary judgment in order
to assert a claim against GSI. However, the economic reality was that
any realization of profit would result only from the giant "match game"
which GSI was playing.
G.S.I., as the seller of commodity "options." can offer in-
vestors a limited risk only by assuming an unlimited market risk
itself. Because G.S.I. failed to cover its market risk with com-
modities futures contracts, or purchase of actual commodities, the
investor was dependent on the efforts of G.S.I. to generate profits
from the solicited premiums of the investors. Thus, the investor
merely purchases a share in the proceeds of the selling efforts of
G.S.I. in raising money from other investors.
20 6
This is an excellent example of a situation in which "form [must
be] disregarded for substance and emphasis placed upon economic
205. Brief for plaintiff at 6, SEC v. First Leisure Corp., Civil No. 72-2616-RJK
(C.D. Cal., filed Mar. 12, 1973).
206. Brief for Plaintiff at 14, SEC v. Goldstein Samuelson, Inc., Civil No. 73-472-
RIK (C.D. Cal., filed Apr. 2, 1973).
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reality ,,207  In substance, GSI operated in such a way that the distinc-
tion between realization of profit and payment was artificial. The
most pernicious aspect of the scheme was the concealment of the sub-
stance of the transaction and its attendant risks. Thus the optionees,
without their knowledge or consent, were channeled into a common en-
terprise whereby any profit they would obtain would be contingent on
the changing fortunes of GSI. Viewed in this light, the SEC has made
a strong argument that the scheme falls within the four corners of
Howey.
208
Applying a risk analysis, an even stronger case is made against
GSI, and the analysis is far less cluttered with red herring issues such as
payment. Utilizing the Silver Hills doctrine, the Califorma court had
little difficulty determining that GSI was a disguised venture capital
offering of the most speculative variety The investor's risk was not
lessened merely because these interests were labeled "options." As in
Silver Hills, the risk of loss was allocated to the public and not to the
promoter. Thus, GSI's options fell squarely within the regulatory pur-
pose of the Blue Sky Law.
Whether the same analysis would carry the day at the federal level
requires the consideration of an additional issue, the profit element of
Howey GSI is a law professor's dream because it trains the spotlight
on the subtle tension between the "profit motive" of Howey and the
"valuable benefit" doctrine of Silver Hills. To be sure "profits" should
not be restrictively interpreted as a share in the balance sheet of the
promoter's company, but it does connote a species of pecuniary invest-
ment return. The most difficult aspect of GSI is the determination
of whether this option constitutes the expectation of pecuniary invest-
ment return. It could be argued that GSI affirmatively represented
these options as a way to get rich quickly. As such, GSI seems to
be offering all of the affirmative economic inducements which the acts
were designed to redress. If the promoter's scheme and representa-
tions led the buyer to expect "profits" through the employment of Ins
investment capital, then it is not inappropriate for the offering to be
judged as it was represented to be. That interpretation, however,
would be a strained legal fiction. The better view is that in promising
the investor an option GSI has not promised a "profit." What GSI has
207. SECv. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946).
208. This was the conclusion of Hon. Hugh M. Caldwell, referee m bankruptcy,
on facts substantially identical to GSL To date, this is the only federal authority
on this issue. See In re Traders Int'l Ltd., Civil No. 7350 (D. Nev., filed Aug. 23,
1973).
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done is to promise a valuable benefit, the opportunity to play the com-
modities game. GSI is thus a risk capital case which squarely indicates
the need for a risk capital analysis in order to effectuate the policy of
the acts.
20 9
Within the ambit of "risk capital," GSI is a good example of the
salutary effect of the initial capitalization concept. Presumably, if
Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., a financially responsible
entity, offered the same options and underwrote them with its assets,
the degree of risk would be greatly lessened. In that situation, leaving
aside the question of whether commodities and thus commodities op-
tions should be independently classified as securities or instruments
commonly known as securities, no security would result under the risk
capital analysis.
Land Sales Financing
A classic image of investment fraud is that of the hapless man
from Minnesota who is fast-talked into a "bargain" purchase of sunny
Florida swamp land or Arizona desert. For years the real estate in-
dustry has played host to some of the most outrageous charlatans in
the annals of American swindling. Such fraud usually takes the form
either of the promotion of physically inferior property or of the em-
ployment of sharp practices aimed at selling acreage through market-
ing techniques similar to those used in the securities industry and
wholly unlike those normally used in the sale of real estate. Nowhere
is this combination of evils more apparent than in the nationwide mar-
keting of raw "investment" acreage in the "planned communities of
tomorrow" Although it may seem strange to some that a securities
theory is used as the legal assault on these unscrupulous developers,210
one will recall that both Joiner and Howey involved land transac-
tions. In other words, it is not what you sell, but how you sell it, or as
Professor Loss put it:
[N]o "investment contract" is involved when a person invests in
real estate, with the hope perhaps of earmng a profit as the result
of a general increase in values concurrent with the development
of the neighborhood, as long as he does not do so as part of an
209. See text accompanying note 111 supra.
210. Many of these practices have been regulated since April 29, 1969 (the effec-
tive date) by the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1701-20 (1970).
The Land Sales Act, however, is not an exclusive remedy and will, of course, include
many typical land sales other than those disguised as public offerings. Thus there is
an overlap with the securities laws, but not a usurpation.
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enterprise whereby it is expressly or impliedly understood that
the property will be developed or operated by others.
21'
Although there is an enormous variety of possible land sales opera-
tions, the typical transaction looks something like this: A developer will
purchase a large parcel of unimproved land at prices comparable to sur-
rounding unimproved property. The developer will then "subdivide"
the property and make minimal improvements in order to showcase the
property. Lots in the new community are then sold through a high-
priced marketing program featuring low down payments and monthly
payments over a substantial period of time. Improvements which
would allow "occupancy" of the land are generally deferred. Although
on the surface, this may appear to be an innocent business, the econ-
omic reality is to the contrary.
The cost of building a new community is enormous. In compari-
son to this cost, the initial capital supplied by the developer is minimal
and the risk of the venture falls upon members of the public who pur-
chase "lots." In order to make the venture profitable, the developer
must sell the lots at a price sufficient to pay for future improvements,
sales costs, debt service and land costs plus his profit. The resulting
price is thus wholly unrelated to the normal market pricing of com-
parable undeveloped real estate.
For example, one developer is alleged to have purchased Ari-
zona desert acreage at an average price of about $61 per acre. Lots
were laid out and improvements were installed after which its own ap-
praiser estimated the value of the land to be $175 per lot (the cost
of usable and unusable land to the developer had by then increased
to $100 per acre.) The developer than sold lots to the public at an
average price of $5,000, not per acre, but per average quarter-acre
lot. The plaintiffs allege that the sales price was computed by an over-
all formula taking into account the minimal cost of the land, the cost
of engineering, the estimated cost of development including debt ser-
vice, the cost of selling the land, and to all this adding a profit of 30
percent of the total gross.2 1  Because this type of development can
only be marketed through an extensive sales program, the cost of sell-
ing the lots runs from 30 percent to as much as 50 percent of the sales
price. The economic reality is, therefore, that the funds to finance
211. 1 Loss, supra note 6, at 491-92 (emphasis added).
212. These facts are based upon those alleged by plaintiffs to be true in Mancini
v. GAC Corp., Civil No. 72-45-TUC-JAW (D. Ariz., 1973), in which co-author, J.
Thomas Hannan appears as one of the counsel of record for the plaintiffs. The case
is considered in more detail m note 213 infra.
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the development of the new community are coming from the public
through installment land purchase payments. This technique may be
described as an inverted pyramid, with respect to value, wherein the
value of the lots when sold is nowhere near the sales price, but in
theory the value goes in while the purchaser provides the capital through
installment payments.
Most of these developments have been sold to the public so far by
means of a marketing program which represents the product largely as
a profit opportunity Thus, the courts may apply a traditional Howey
analysis in finding the investment of money (cash) in a common en-
terprise (the development as a whole since the individual lots are not
in the normal sense umque) with the expectation of a profit (upon
subsequent resale because "land" values and real estate are alleged al-
ways to appreciate) solely from the efforts of the promoter or third
persons (the success of the community development in reality depends
upon the promoter).
The first reported case holding a land sales financing transaction
to be a security under the 1933 act is Johnson v Suburban Land In-
vestment Co.213 The case is a classic Howey situation in which the
promoter sold land to the public under an agreement whereby the pur-
chaser would subordinate the land to the control of the promoter for
the purposes of constructing a new residential subdivision. The anal-
ysis of the court followed the Howey rationale. The court was not
troubled by language in the contracts which provided that the investors
would control the land improvement, because the economic reality
213. [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP 94,022, at 94,100 (Sup. Ct. D.C.
June 1, 1973. Two other class actions in which securities acts violations are alleged have
been certified under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In Tober v. Char-
nita, Inc., 58 F.R.D. 74 (M.D. Pa. 1973), a class action was certified in which the
federal claim arose under the 1933 and 1934 Acts. While such a certification does
not constitute a finding that the transactions in question are securities, the court found
there are sufficient common questions of fact and law as required by Rule 23(a)(2)
and devoted considerable discussion to the reliance issue in federal securities cases. This
at least indicates a sufficiently serious belief that the issue is raised in order to gear-
up the machinery of the federal courts to handle a substantial class action. At the
same time, the court also certified as a class action Hoffman v. Charnita, Inc., 58
F.R.D. 86 (M.D. Pa. 1973), arising under the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure
Act.
The second case wherein the issue has been raised is Mancmi v. GAC Corp., Civil
No. 72-45-TUC-JAW (D. Ariz., 1973). Mancini has been certified as a class action
under the 1934 Act and the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act. The defendants'
motion for summary judgment asserting that the sale of subdivision lots could not be
a security under the facts of the case was denied. See text accompanying note 212
for a discussion of the general factual situation.
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was that only the developer had the expertise required to carry out
the planning and construction of a new commumty. In that regard,
the court stated:
The economic reality of Suburban Land's activities was this: In-
vestors, ignorant of the intricacies of the construction business,
provided Suburban Land with the necessary capital to proceed
with the construction project by purchasing the parcels of Virginia
real estate and executing the contracts for services in the imple-
mentation of the plan for the construction of a new community.
As in Howey. these investors were attracted to the 'Suburban
Concept' 'solely by the prospects of a return on their invest-
ment.' For the investors here to involve themselves in an intri-
cate plan to construct a new housing development which requires
a plethora of expertise would not only have vitiated the feasi-
bility of such an investment from the investor's viewpoint, but also
would have prevented Suburban Land from seriously proceeding
with its plans.
2 14
The promoter thus receives his financing and the purchasers bear
all the risk. The price premium over the present value of the lot repre-
sents the amount of risk capital. That is, return on those dollars is con-
tingent solely upon the success of the developer in completing the pro-
jects.
Developers are now getting the message, and are beginning to
look for holes in the classic Howey formula. Previously, they have
argued that land is uique, that each participant could improve his own
land, and that therefore the "solely" language of Howey precluded the
finding of an investment contract. These arguments have generally
been unavailing.215 The current thrust appears to be to water down
the "profit" representations; yet, it is submitted that application of the
risk and risk capital analyses forecloses this exit where in substance
the new community is financed in such a fashion that the principal risk
falls upon the public. This may be the next area in which the Silver
Hills approach will find acceptance under the federal securities laws.
Other Problems of Definition
Statutory Construction
As we have seen, the Supreme Court has not encouraged attempts
to limit the definition of the term security.2 1 6 There is, however, one
limitation some lower courts, the SEC and Professor Loss seem to en-
214. Johnson v. Suburban Land Inv. Co., [Current Binder] CCH FED. Suc. L. REP.
If 94,022, at 94,105 (Sup. CL D.C. June 1, 1973).
215. See notes 213-214 supra.
216. See text accompanying notes 20-53 supra.
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dorse. That limitation stems from the introductory phrase to the defi-
nitional sections of the principal federal securities statutes.
The introductory phrase reads in essence:21 "When used in this
[title or sub-chapter], unless the context otherwise requires [the defi-
nitions including security mean]." That phrase might appear to mean
that the definition is as set forth in the defimtional section unless the
language surrounding the term elsewhere in the act indicates other-
wise. It would be most difficult to find such language, yet Professor
Loss understands the statement as explicit recogmtion of an old prm-
ciple of construction. Quoting Justice Holmes, he notes that the same
word may have different meamngs within the same act. Thus, he con-
cludes that congressional intent may be used as a guide in applying
the term to the various provisions of the act. 1 "
The SEC has adopted this rationale with respect to the definition
of the term "sale" for the purposes of section 5 of the 1933 Act and
in so doing has specifically pointed out that the definition adopted for
the purposes of Rule 133 did not apply to the antifraud provisions of
the 1933 and 1934 Acts. 19 The Supreme Court endorsed that view in
SEC v National Securities, Inc.,220 wherein the Court stated:
Although the interdependence of the various sections of the
securities laws is certainly a relevant factor in any interpretation
of the language Congress has chosen, ordinary rules of statutory
construction still apply. The meamng of particular phrases must
be determined in context. Congress itself has cautioned that
the same words may take on a different coloration in different
sections of the securities laws; both the 1933 and the 1934 Acts
preface their lists of general definitions with the phrase "unless
the context otherwise requires." We must therefore address
ourselves to the meaning of the words "purchase or sale" in the
context of § 10(b).22 1.
It is therefore possible that the term security may have a different
meaning for different purposes (for example, registration as opposed
to antifraud or perhaps even implied antifraud actions). Without pre-
dicting what differences, if any, there may be,222 this realization should
217 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b; Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a); Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79b(a);
Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a); Investment Advisers Act of
1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a) (1970) all contain nearly identical paragraphs to their
definitional sections (emphasis added).
218. 4 Loss, supra note 6, at 2485 (Supp. 1969).
219. See SEC Securities Act Release 3420 (Aug. 2, 1951). See also 1 Loss, supra
note 6, at 524-25.
220. 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
221. Id. at 466.
222. See note 19 supra.
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lessen the expressed and unexpressed concern of courts that the ramifi-
cations of decisions in one area may be devastating in other areas.
Other Definitional "Pegs"
This article has been principally concerned with analysis in the
light of case development and the policy underlying the securities acts.
Most of the development has involved or been related to investment
contracts. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has given a clear indica-
tion that practitioners should not limit their analysis to investment con-
tracts or their equivalent in considering what may be a security.223 It
is beyond the purview of this article to consider exhaustively all trans-
actions which may involve securities. It is appropriate, however, to
touch upon some of the other definitional pegs winch are available.
It may be that any note is within the definition of a security un-
der the federal securities laws when they are read literally. Though the
protection of -the securities laws is designed to be broad, the possibility of
including all of the possible interpretations of all of the terms included
in the statutory definitions would vastly expand the reach of the acts.
Some lower courts are beginning to fashion another limitation with re-
spect to certain all-encompassing terms in the definition such as "note"
or "evidence of indebtedness." This limitation, as discussed above, is
based upon the introductory phrase to the definitional sections of the
1933 and the 1934 Acts.224
Both acts specifically include the word "note," although the phrase
"evidence of indebtedness" is absent from the 1934 Act.2  Taken
together, the literal import of these terms would seem to extend the
coverage of the securities acts to nearly every personal loan or credit
purchase. Many courts infer that such may be the case.
[T]his definition of a security [any note . . or any certificate
of interest or participation in . any of the foregoing] has been
literally read by the judiciary to the extent that almost all notes
are held to be securities. 2
26
As recently as June of 1972, the Seventh Circuit announced:
"[A]ny note, regardless of its nature, terms or conditions, is fully sub-
ject to whatever antifraud provisions are included in the five acts.
'227
In that case, the court held that promissory notes offered to the public
223. See text accompanying notes 45-49 supra.
224. See text accompanying notes 217-222 supra.
225. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
226. Lehigh Valley Trust Co. v. Central Nat'l Bank, 409 F.2d 989, 991-92 (5th
Cir. 1969) (emphasis added).
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with a maturity not exceeding nine months did not come within the
statutory exclusion of the 1934 Act. 2 The exclusionary language
was strictly limited to apply
only to (1) prime quality negotiable commercial paper (2)
of a type not ordinarily purchased by the general public, that is,
(3) paper issued to facilitate well recogmzed types of current op-
erational business requirements and (4) of a type eligible for dis-
counting by Federal Reserve banks.
2 29
Likewise, the phrase "evidence of indebtedness" has been given
an expansive reading. In June of 1972, the Tenth Circuit upheld a
criminal conviction pursuant to the 1933 Act for the floating of a bogus
loan commitment letter. The court stated: "The term 'evidence of
indebtedness' is not limited to a promissory note or other simple ac-
knowledgement of debt owing and is held to include all contractual ob-
ligations to pay in the future for consideration presently received.
'" 23 0
In Movielab, Inc. v Berkey Photo, Inc.,231 Judge Mansfield dem-
onstrated his awareness of these broad precedents. In that case, the
plaintiff corporation issued notes to defendant corporation, both pub-
licly held, for $10.5 million payable over a twenty year period in ex-
change for assets of the defendant corporation. Judge Mansfield re-
luctantly agreed that these notes appeared to constitute securities.
Try as we may, we fail to detect in the 1934 Act any grant of
discretionary power to the court to construe the term "security"
as including certain types of notes but not others. Congress ap-
parently decided that it would pass a sweeping prohibition rather
than attempt to draw such distinctions. We are bound by that de-
cision.
232
Impelled by that mandate, the judge shared an uneasiness over
where the line is to be drawn.
If instruments used m every private loan transaction qualified as
securities under the federal statutes, our jurisdiction could be in-
yoked with respect to any claim of fraud in connection with the
issuance of a check or note, no matter how small the transaction
227 Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d 1075, 1078 (7th Cir. 1972).
228. "[B]ut [the term 'security'] shall not include currency or any note, draft,
bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a maturity at the time of issuance
of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the
maturity of which is likewise limited." Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(10), 15
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1970).
229. Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d 1075, 1079 (7th Cir. 1972).
230. United States v. Austin, 462 F.2d 724, 736 (10th Cir. 1972). In reaching
this conclusion, the court borrowed from the interpretation given to the phrase "evi-
dence of indebtedness" in the Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2311 (1970).
231. 321 F Supp. 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
232. Id. at 809.
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(e.g., the purchase of an automobile or refrigerator), provided
the mails or some other instrumentality of interstate commerce
were used. Furthermore, the maker of the note or check as well
as the payee would be entitled to sue. We do not view this as
the type of situation that prompted the enactment of the federal
securities laws.
233
The answer may come from the context analysis previously dis-
cussed. That type of analysis was applied by Judge Woodward in the
recent case of McClure v. First National Bank.234 The issue was whe-
ther the execution of promissory notes and the fraudulent misapplica-
tion of the funds obtained thereby stated a claim for relief pursuant to
section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. The court held that it did not. The
court felt that a private loan transaction which was a matter of internal
corporate management did not fall within the coverage of the act.
To sustain this view, Judge Woodward strained to reconcile the legion
of precedent that would seem to oppose him. He began by citing
the language in Lehigh Valley Trust that "almost all notes are held to
be securities.123 5  By logical deduction then, there are some notes
which do not constitute securities. Since the statutory language states
that the act covers "any note . . .unless the context otherwise re-
quired" the judge set out to delineate under what circumstances Con-
gress intended to extend federal protection. The court concluded:
.. . the Act was designed primarily and almost exclusively to
curb abuses involved m 'trading for speculation or investment.'
Thus the Act is designed to deal with substance over form and
to regulate and prohibit fraud involved in the sale of promissory
notes where such notes are sold or traded for purposes of specu-
lation or investment in the same way that stock, bonds, or debentures
might be traded, sold or exchanged. Such an interpretation of the
"any note" provision of the statute is consistent with the 'dominat-
ing general purpose' of the Act and specifically of 15 U.S.C. §
78j(b).230
Thus Judge Woodward endeavored to circumscribe the applica-
tion of "note" to include only those transactions which are the techmcal
equivalent of a public offering or issuance of stock. In contrast, where
the transaction is merely a garden variety commencal loan, the judge
contended that no policy of the securities act is invoked. The broad
language of Judge Mansfield is distinguished on the grounds that the
233. Id. at 808.
234. [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,986, at 93,964 (N.D. Tex. Jan.
11, 1973). See also Joseph v. Norman's Health Club, Inc., 336 F Supp. 307, 313 (E.D.
Mo. 1971).
235. [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,986, at 93,965.
236. Id.
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transaction involved in Movielab was equivalent to a merger by the
sale of assets. "In Movielab Corporation A merely issued a note in
place of its stock.
'237
Similarly, the court in McClure distinguished United States v
Austin238 on the basis that the letter of commitment did not consti-
tue an ordinary commerical loan. Although Judge Woodward disagreed
with the broad language of the Seventh Circuit in Sanders v John Nu-
veen & Co.,239 nevertheless, in his view, that case did support his pol-
icy distinctions.
Sanders does provide, however, a useful and cogent distinction be-
tween two different kinds of notes: commercial (not covered by
the Act, in the view of this Court) and investment (covered by
the Act). The former is created "when a prospective borrower
approaches a bank for a loan and gives his note in consideration
for it." The latter is created when a person "seeks to invest his
money and receives a note in return for it."
12 40
The court cited SEC v Addison,24' as a perfect example of a
situation in which a note transaction constituted a securities violation.
There, "defendants needed money to get into operation and
in order to finance such operations, they were soliciting uncondi-
tional unsecured loans of money from members of the general
public. Such defrauding of public investors is precisely within
the purview of the Act."2 42
Whether or not the result in McClure is correct, this type of anal-
ysis is likely to be repeated in future cases, although probably with a
more thorough risk analysis. That approach seems to be the only
sensible way to achieve a workable result.243  One must be cognizant,
237. Id. at 93,968. Judge Mansfield's opinion might be so read since it stated:
"[i1t must be conceded that notes of the type issued here are frequently discounted,
purchased for investment, hypothecated, or otherwise made the subject of dealings in
the market place." Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 321 F Supp. 806, 809
(S.D.N.Y 1970).
Further, the appellate court, in affirming the Movielab decision below on an inter-
locutory appeal, stated: "[Alppellants strenuously urge that claims of fraud in con-
nection with the issuance of notes in every private loan transaction cannot be within
the scope of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 We need not deal with the
hypothetical situation." Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 452 F.2d 662, 663 (2d
Cir. 1971), per curiam (emphasis added).
238. 462 F.2d 724 (10th Cir. 1972).
239. 463 F.2d 1075 (7th Cir. 1972).
240. McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
93,986, at 93,969 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 1973).
241. 194 F Supp. 709 (N.D. Tex. 1961).
242. McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. RE, P
93,986, at 93,969 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 1973), citing SEC v. Addison, 194 F Supp. at
715.
243. In the recent case of Lino v. City Investing, Inc. [Current Binder] CCH FED.
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however, of the Supreme Court's caution about reading the defimtions
too restrictively.244
Another area in which the "note or evidence of indebtedness"
defimtions should apply is that of land sale financing. Coffey and
Welch recognized this when they wrote:
As for the so-called installment lot transactions, the testimony
revealed that buyers were actually acquiring very little more than
creditors' claims against the developers under the guise of multi-
payment conditional sales contracts. . .. It is difficult to char-
acterize the purchaser's payments as much more than a loan to
the developer. In essence, the developer is selling a debt instru-
ment coupled with a specious commitment to repay by means of
specific property. Such a transaction differs considerably from
the installment sale of a residence, where the purchaser takes pos-
session of the property, and the entire deal is viewed as a loan by
the seller to the purchaser, with the vendor retammg title as
security for payment.24
5
Although the Supreme Court has focused principally upon invest-
ment contracts, it has also mentioned other definitions. In Joiner for
example, the Court mentioned that the transaction constituted an "in-
terest or instrument commonly known as security. '246 Justice Brennan,
concurring in VALIC, thought that variable annuity interests were pos-
sibly also "certificates of interest or participation in a profit-sharng
agreement '247 and in Tcherepnin the Court mentioned several alterna-
tive terms.
248
The District Court in SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises,
Inc.2 49 took heed of this opening only to have the Ninth Circuit limit
its affirmance to an investment contract definition. Nevertheless,
Judge Skopil's opinion is an excellent example of the use of other defi-
nitional pegs and of the analysis which supports them. The judge
concluded on the basis of a risk capital theory that the scheme involved
an instrument "commonly known as a security" and that the Dare To
SEc. L. REP. 94,124, at 94,502 (3rd Cir. Aug. 20, 1973), the court considered most
of the note cases cited herein. Relying on McClure and the context argument, the court
held that promissory notes given by an investor to his franchisor were not securities
due to the commercial context of the transaction and the lack of legislative intent to
bring such transactions within the scope of the act.
244. See text accompanying notes 2-44 supra.
245. Coffey & Welch, Federal Regulation of Land Sales: Full Disclosure Comes
Down to Earth, 21 CASE W. Rns. L. R v. 5, 13 (1969).
246. 320 U.S. at 351.
247. 359 U.S. at 74 n.4.
248. 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
249. 348 F. Supp. 766 (D. Ore. 1972).
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Be Great franchises fell within that definitional peg.250 Likewise, the
court found the franchises to be "certificates of interest or participation
in profit-sharing agreements." Significantly, Judge Skopil pointed out
that the mechanical rubric of Howey is not to be viewed as a limitation
upon these other terms even if it were a limitation upon investment
contracts (a limitation he rejects).25'
There is thus sufficient precedent for those counseling clients to
look at transactions carefully to ascertain whether another definitional
peg may be applicable. Litigators should be particularly aware of
these pegs where a transaction "feels" as though it involves some kind
of security, yet is not within the classic Howey test.
Conclusion
Not unlike the Umted States Constitution, the definitional sections
of the federal securities laws were designed to be broad and dynamic,
and thus capable of dealing with a developing commerical society 252
With forty years of experience behind us, it appears that one of the
principal applications of the federal securities laws has been to foster
disclosure of risk to investors. It is the term risk, together with econ-
omic reality, which underlies this article more than any other. In anal-
yzing the countless ventures one may participate in, the case law gen-
erally focuses in one fashion or another upon economic reality and risk
in ascertaining whether the venture is one Congress intended to en-
compass within the securities laws. That premise is not always articu-
lated, but it clearly underlies three of the five Supreme Court decisions
construing the term security and is arguably a factor in the other two.
253
250. "The spread of the risk capital theory from the state in which it was first
applied to other states and the favorable comment with which it has been received
make it an appropriate test to look to for determining what is 'commonly known as
a security.' There probably have been few schemes devised that more closely meet
the test than does the defendants' promotion. In the opinion of the Court, both the
letter and the purposes of the statutes are satisfied by holding, therefore, that defend-
ants are offering and selling contracts which are commonly known as securities within
the meaning of the federal statutes." Id. at 774. The opinion includes a list of
jurisdictions adopting the risk capital theory.
251. "It should be recalled that the 'solely from the efforts of others' test is part
of the definition of investment contract, not of the definition of security. More specifi-
cally, the Supreme Court has not said that in order for a transaction to constitute a
certificate of interest or participation in a profit-sharing agreement it must contemplate
no effort on the part of the investor." Id. at 776.
252. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing
Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
253. There is no suggestion in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946)
that there was a lack of financial responsibility on the part of either the Howey Com-
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Thus, where the risk is shifted to the participant there will likely be a
security. It does not, however, follow that a security may not be found
under the Howey formula or otherwise where the risk is not shifted.
There has been a tendency in most of the cases to discuss only
investment contracts when dealing with nonobvious securities (un-
like stocks and bonds). That tendency has been fostered largely by
the Supreme Court's focus upon "investment contracts," although the
Court has plainly encouraged the use of other definitional pegs includ-
ing the very flexible "interest commonly known as a security."
In this era of class actions combined with securities litigation,
public and private, one can expect a substantial volume of cases ex-
ploring the parameters of the securities laws. It is imperative that fu-
ture cases closely examine the economic reality to ascertain where the
risk of the venture is allocated. The analytic framework set forth in
this article may be helpful in making an analysis of future transac-
tions.
pany or the Howey-in-the-Hills Service, Inc., yet the risk of loss was upon the public
as to the undivided interests sold. Teherepmn v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967) is
the least risk oriented case. The opinion of the court of appeals shows that there was
little risk of loss to the investors since the shares (deposits) were insured by the Fed-
eral Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation up to $15,000. The risks were thus with-
drawable on shares m excess of a total of $15,000 and upon the nonpayment of divi-
dends. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 371 F.2d 374, 379 (7th Cir. 1967).
Addendum: The case of SEC v. Goldstein Samuelson cited in note 192 has been
settled without trial, leaving the important securities issue unresolved. On October
29, 1973, Goldstein Samuelson, Inc. and Harold Goldstein stipulated to a consent de-
cree whereby the defendants admitted the jurisdiction of the district court and agreed
to the entry of a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendants from engaging m
the naked commodity option business. On November 9, 1973, District Judge E. Avery
Crary sentenced Harold Goldstein to 15 years in federal prison on three counts of mail
fraud subject to further review upon completion of a 90 day psychiatric examination.
With the company m receivership, the issuance of a permanent injunction, and the
chairman of the board in jail, the S.E.C. would appear to have won a clear-cut victory
in the case. What the S.E.C. did not achieve, however, was binding judicial precedent
holding that naked commodity options are securities and therefore within the jurisdic-
tion of the S.E.C. and the federal courts. Since dealers in naked commodity options
are continuing to spring up throughout the nation, it is highly unlikely that this consent
decree has laid these difficulties to rest.
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